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Abstract
Despite the great achievements made by neural networks on tasks such as image classification, they are brittle and vulnerable to adversarial example (AE) attacks, which
are crafted by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to inputs in order that a
neural-network-based classifier incorrectly labels them. Along with the prevalence of
deep learning techniques, the threat of AEs attracts increasingly attentions since it
may lead to serious consequences in some vital applications such as disease diagnosis.
To defeat attacks based on AEs, both detection and defensive techniques attract
the research community’s attention. Given an input image, the detection system
outputs whether it is an AE, so that the target neural network can reject those
adversarial inputs. A defense technique, given an AE, helps the target neural network
make correct prediction by either rectifying the AE or fortifying the classifier itself.
While many countermeasures against AEs have been proposed, recent studies
show that the existing detection methods usually goes ineffective when facing adaptive
AEs. In this work, we exploit AEs by identifying their noticeable characteristics.
First, we noticed that L2 adversarial perturbations are among the most effective
but difficult-to-detect attacks. How to detect adaptive L2 AEs is still an open question. At the same time, we find that, by randomly erasing some pixels in an L2
AE and then restoring it with an inpainting technique, the AE, before and after the
steps, tends to have different classification results, while a benign sample does not
show this symptom. We thus propose a novel AE detection technique, Erase-andRestore (E&R), that exploits the intriguing sensitivity of L2 attacks. Comprehensive
experiments conducted on standard image datasets show that the proposed detector
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is effective and accurate. More importantly, our approach demonstrates strong resilience to adaptive attacks. We also interpret the detection technique through both
visualization and quantification.
Second, previous work considers that it is challenging to properly alleviate the
effect of the heavy corruptions caused by L0 attacks. However, we argue that the uncontrollable heavy perturbation is an inherent limitation of L0 AEs, and thwart such
attacks. We thus propose a novel AE detector by converting the detection problem
into a comparison problem. More concretely, given an image I, it is pre-processed
to obtain another image I 0 . Then, a well-trained Siamese network automatically and
precisely captures the discrepancies between I and I 0 to detect L0 perturbations. In
addition, we show that the pre-processing technique used for detection can also work
as an effective defense, which has a high probability of removing the adversarial influence of L0 perturbations. Thus, our system demonstrates not only high AE detection
accuracies, but also a notable capability to correct the classification results.
Finally, we propose a comprehensive AE detector which systematically combines
the two aforementioned detection methods to thwart all categories of widely discussed
AEs, i.e., L0 , L2 , and L∞ attacks. By acquiring the both strengths from its assembly
components, the new hybrid AE detector is not only able to distinguish various
kinds of AEs, but also has a very low false positive rate on benign images. More
significantly, through exploiting the noticeable characteristics of AEs, the proposed
detector is highly resilient to adaptive attack, filling a critical gap in AE detection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Background

Recent years have witnessed tremendous success of neural networks in a variety of
fields, such as object detection [1], motion tracking [2], and face recognition [3, 4].
Despite these great achievements, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples (AEs).
Szegedy et al. [5] analyze the robustness of neural networks when facing adversarial
attacks, and show that deep learning systems are sensitive to small adversarial perturbations. A neural-network-based classifier thus can be misled by AEs and generate
incorrect classification results.
The term adversarial example can be formally defined as following. For a pretrained neural network f , let x be an original image. An adversarial example xadv
is such an intentionally designed input by attackers which can guide the model f
to make an incorrect prediction. Moreover, to hide the adversarial perturbation,
the generation of xadv is equivalent to solve the following constrained optimization
problem:
min
kxadv − xkp
adv
x

s.t. ȳ = f (xadv )

(1.1)

y = f (x)
y 6= ȳ
where y and ȳ are respectively the prediction results of feeding x and xadv to f , and
k · kp denotes the Lp -norm.
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The adversarial perturbations in an image AE are usually subtle in order to be
human-imperceptible. To quantitatively describe such adversarial perturbations, Lp
norms are usually used to measure the discrepancy between x and xadv . According
to the value of p in Equation 1.1, the mainstream AE generation algorithms can be
categorized into three families: L0 , L2 and L∞ attacks. Informally, L0 measures the
number of modified pixels, L2 the Euclidean distance between x and xadv , and L∞
the largest modification among all the modified pixels.
Depending on the manner of how ȳ misleads a pre-trained classifier, adversarial
attacks to neural networks can be categorized as either targeted or non-targeted. The
aim of non-targeted attacks is to make the image be classified as any arbitrary class
except the true one. By contrast, in targeted attacks the prediction result will be
misguided to a specific class different from the correct one and desired by the attacker.
Many image AE generation methods have been proposed and multiple off-the-shelf
tools are available [6–9].
To defeat attacks based on AEs, both detection and defensive techniques attract
the research community’s attention. Given an input image, the detection system
outputs whether it is an AE, so that the target neural network can reject those adversarial inputs. A defense technique, given an AE, helps the target neural network
make correct prediction by either rectifying the AE or fortifying the classifier itself.
In this work, we focus on AE detection and aim at accurate, resilient, and explainable
countermeasures against AEs through exploiting their noticeable characteristics.

1.2

Adversarial Examples Generation

In this section, we will describe several popular AE generation methods briefly.

2

1.2.1

Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)

As a classic non-targeted attack, FGSM is proposed to generate an adversarial example through adding a pixel-wise perturbation of magnitude [6]. In detail, the
perturbation is computed as:
xadv = x +  · sign(∇x J(x, y))

(1.2)

where J is the classification loss function which has been used for training a target
DNN model, and  is a parameter that controls the the strength of perturbation. Since
the perturbation for each pixel is performed only once along one gradient direction,
FGSM is a very efficient way to generate AEs.

1.2.2

Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM)

By implementing FGSM in an iterative way, Kurakin et al. [8] proposed IGSM which
takes N small steps of magnitude α = /N and adjusts the direction after each step.
Furthermore, during computing perturbation, this algorithm clips the pixel values to
ensure that they are in an reasonable range. The iterative computation of AEs using
IGSM can be expressed as:
xadv
=x
0
xadv
i+1

=

xadv
i

(1.3)
+ clip(α ·

sign(∇x J(xadv
i , y)))

where xadv
and clip respectively denote the perturbed sample at i iteration and a
i
clipping of the adversarial sample’s values. Since this iterative way makes the attack
tend to overfit to a particular model, IGSM is more effective to white-box in which
the target DNN is known than black-box i.e. attackers have no knowledge about that
target model.
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1.2.3

Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)

The JSMA is a targeted attack based on a greedy iterative idea proposed by Papernot
et al. [7]. It takes L0 distance minimization as the optimization target, that is,
the number of pixels that can be updated in the original image is bounded. To
determine which pixels will be manipulated, the authors introduce the concept of
saliency map which provides an adversarial saliency score for each pixel. One single
pixel that possesses a higher adversarial saliency score usually has more impact on
misleading the target model to predict a specific label desired by attackers. Thus,
the attacker only manipulates those pixels that have high adversarial saliency scores
in each iterative step based on a greedy strategy. The adversarial saliency score for
each pixel is calculated as:

xadv
i,t






0,

if

= xi,t + 

∂ft (x)
∂xi

< 0 or


∂ft (x) P ∂fj (x)


|,
 ∂xi |
∂xi

P ∂fj (x)
j6=t

∂xi

>0
(1.4)

otherwise

j6=t

where i denotes the ith pixel in the image, and fj is the prediction value of the neuron
j in the target model’s output layer.

1.2.4

DeepFool

Moosavi et al. [10] developed the DeepFool attack that is used to create non-targeted
AEs. The algorithm utilizes an iterative linearization of the classifier to generate
L2 minimization-based perturbations. To simplify the problem, the neural networks
are imagined to be linear, so that the decision boundaries are a set of hyper-planes.
Consequently, a polyhedron can be used to describe the output space. Assuming that
f is a binary differentiable classifier, to mislead the decision of f near the current point
xi , the minimal perturbation is the orthogonal projection of xi onto the separating
hyper-plane. At each iteration the minimal perturbation of the linearized classifier is
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computed as
arg min kδi k2
δi

s.t. f (xi ) + ∇f (xi )T δi = 0

(1.5)

where δi is the perturbation imposed on xi . Note that neural networks are not actually
linear, so the search is repeated until a successful AE is found.

1.2.5

Carlini & Wagner Attacks

Carlini and Wagner [9] designed a group of targeted AE generation methods which are
denoted as CW attacks. According to the distance metrics adopted in an optimization
target, CW attacks can be divided into three types: L0 -, L2 - and L∞ -norm. The
attack can be formulated as the following optimization problem:
min kδkp + c · g(x + δ) s.t. x + δ ∈ [0, 1]n

(1.6)

where kδkp is distance measurement. The function g(·) indicates whether the attack
succeed or not, which is defined as:
g(x0 ) = max(Z(x0 )lx − max{Z(x0 )i : i 6= lx }, −κ)

(1.7)

where Z(·) denotes the logits, that is the output of the last layer (before the softmax
layer) of a DNN, and κ is a parameter that controls the confidence-level in creating
an AE.
Due to a few creative designs, the CW attacks achieve performance superior to
other attack methods. The first and foremost innovative design is using a logitsbased objective function rather than softmax-cross-entropy loss, which plays a key
role in the resilience improvement of the attack against defensive distillation [11].
Secondly, this algorithm maps the target variable to a space of the inverse trigonometric function, so that the problem is suitable to be solved by a modern optimizer,
e.g. Adam [12]. Finally, a confidence-level parameter κ is introduced; as κ increases,
the model classifies the resulting AE as the attacker-desired label more likely, giving
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the attacker flexibility to make a trade-off between the degree of perturbations and
misclassification probability.

1.3

Threat Model

The adversary has full knowledge of the target model (including both its architecture
and parameters). He also knows the existence and internal details of the detector,
and is allowed to adapt attacks. In adaptive attacks, the attacker tries to fool the
image classifier and the detector at the same time. We consider adaptive attacks and
evaluate the resilience of our detector to them in this work.

1.4

Structure of the Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a novel
and effective detector that tackles L2 AEs through destroying the completeness of
the influence by the perturbed pixels. In chapter 3, we consider the uncontrollable
heavy perturbations as an inherent limitation of L0 AEs. Based on this observation,
we thwart such attacks by both detecting and rectifying them. Furthermore, a comprehensive hybrid detector which can detect all categories of AEs, i.e., L0 , L2 , and
L∞ attacks, is introduced in chapter 4. Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the proposed
research, concludes this dissertation, and also discusses the future works.
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Chapter 2
Exploiting the Sensitivity of L2 Adversarial
Examples to Erase-and-Restore
2.1

Introduction

L2 adversarial perturbations by Carlini and Wagner (CW) are amongst the most
effective but difficult-to-detect attacks. As suggested by Carlini and Wagner [9],
defenders should consider evaluating “a powerful attack” and particularly emphasized
L2 attacks (Section 9 in [9]). Other researchers also agree that L2 attacks by Carlini
and Wagner (CW) [9] “are among the most effective white-box attacks and should
be used among the primary attacks to evaluate potential defences” [13]. Although
researchers have proposed many AE detection methods [14–17], recent studies [18–
20] show that the detection usually goes ineffective when facing adaptive CW-L2 AEs.
Thus, how to accurately detect adaptive L2 AEs is still an open question. We focus
on tackling L2 AEs in this chapter, and our goal is a technique that not only detects
L2 AEs accurately but is also resilient to adaptive attacks.
We have two key insights. First, we observe that those deliberately corrupted
pixels exert a malicious influence altogether (e.g., through multiple rounds of optimizations during AE generation). It implies that a destruction of the completeness
of the influence by the perturbed pixels can cause a failure of the attack. Second,
while destruction may also harm the classification accuracy for benign samples, there
exist very effective inpainting techniques [21–23] in the image processing area that
can help restore a partially corrupted image. For example, Figure 2.1(a) shows an
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original image, and Figure 2.1(b) a corresponding corrupted image where many regions are erased. After inpainting, as shown in Figure 2.1(c), the corrupted image is
well restored.

(a) Original image

(b) Corrupted image

(c) Restored image

Figure 2.1: Restoring lost parts of an image with inpainting.

Thus, we hypothesize that if we randomly erase a portion of pixels from an
AE and then apply inpainting to it, the attack will probably fail for two reasons.
Discarding many small regions from an AE will ruin the holistic adversarial influence
formed by the maliciously perturbed pixels. Second, the inpainting typically restores
the image in a benign way that does not preserve the malicious influence. By contrast,
if we apply the same “Erase-and-Restore” (E&R) operations to a benign sample, the
classification results, before and after the steps, tend to be similar, as inpainting by
design is to reverse deterioration of benign images.
Figure 2.2 illustrates our insights and observations using six color images from
CIFAR-10. A random mask (mask, for short) in our work describes the locations of
pixels that are randomly erased. We randomly erase 5% of the pixels of each image.
The AEs are generated using the CW algorithm [9]. As shown in Figure 2.2(a), the
classification results of each AE, before and after the E&R operations, are different.
By contrast, as shown in Figure 2.2(b), the classification results of each benign sample,
before and after the steps, are the same. Our large-scale experiments (Section 2.3)
also show consistent results.
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Adversarial
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(a) Adversarial examples

Legitimate
Image

Classiﬁcation
Result

airplane

truck

dog

horse

truck

ship

airplane

truck

dog

horse

truck

ship

Mask
Restored
Image
Classiﬁcation
Result

(b) Benign samples

Figure 2.2: Different impacts of “Erase-and-Restore” on AEs and benign samples.
We consider the sensitivity to E&R operations as an exploitable characteristic
of L2 AEs, and propose a novel AE detection technique: given an image, if the
classification results before and after E&R vary greatly, it is an AE; otherwise, a
benign sample. We accordingly implement an L2 AE detector, named Themis. To
improve the detection accuracy, it is enhanced by applying E&R multiple times.
Specifically, given an image I0 , we randomly erase some pixels of I0 each time to
create a sequence of images {I1 , I2 , · · · , In }. Next, an inpainting technique is applied
to them to obtain the restored images {I10 , I20 , · · · , In0 }. Finally, a classifier makes use
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of the prediction results of I0 and the restored images to determine whether I0 is an
AE.
We have evaluated our system using the popular image datasets CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. Two widely-discussed L2 AE generation methods, CW [9] and DeepFool [10],
are considered in the evaluation. We lay special emphasis on CW [9] because it can
circumvent all existing detectors, especially when adaptive attacks are considered.
Our experiments show that the proposed detection technique is very effective. Take
the CW [9] attack as an example, on the CIFAR-10 dataset, Themis can detect 100%
AEs with a false positive rate (FPR)=0, and on ImageNet, it can detect 99.3% AEs
with FPR = 2.7%. In addition, the detection technique demonstrates three notable
characteristics. ¶ It is target-model agnostic: a detector trained using AEs targeting one neural network model can be directly used to detect AEs targeting another.
· It has good transferability: a detector trained using AEs generated by one attack
method can be directly used to detect AEs by another. ¸ More importantly, it shows
high resilience to adaptive attacks. Finally, we interpret the effectiveness of the
detection technique through both visualization and quantification.
To summarize, in this chapter, we find an interesting characteristic of L2 AEs,
whose classification results vary sharply when Erase-and-Restore operations are applied; meanwhile, benign samples are not so sensitive. Furthermore, we propose
to exploit the characteristic for AE detection, and employ the idea of sampling to
enhance the detection. By applying E&R for multiple times, richer features are
generated to improve the detection accuracy. Besides, we implement the detection
technique in Themis and evaluate it on two popular datasets, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. The experiment results show that Themis outperforms prior techniques (such
as NIC [24], LID [25], and Feature Squeezing [17]), achieving not only the highest
detection rate but also the lowest false positive rate. Plus, due to its simplicity,
it is extremely easy to apply and deploy. The detection technique is target-model
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agnostic and shows high transferability across different L2 attack methods. Not only
that, it demonstrates strong resilience to adaptive CW-L2 attacks, filling a critical
gap in AE detection. Finally, we interpret the effectiveness of the detection technique
in multiple ways.

2.2

Experimental Setup

Before presenting our defense scheme, we introduce the image datasets and the corresponding target neural networks on which we verify our key insights and evaluate
the proposed approach.
Image datasets. We generate AEs using two popular datasets: CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet, both of which are widely used in image classification tasks. In particular,
for ImageNet, we adopt the ILSVRC2012 samples to keep consistent with the prior
state-of-the-art AE detector [24].
Target neural network models. (1) For CIFAR-10, we use two neural networks
as the target models: a 32-layered ResNet model [26] (denoted as ResNet32 ), and
a model structure described in [9] (denoted as Carlini). We train these two target
neural network models from scratch (the accuracies of the two models are 91.96%
and 78.86%, comparable with those published in prior works [17, 24]). (2) For ImageNet we re-use a 50-layered ResNet model [26] provided in Keras [27] (denoted as
ResNet50 ).
AE generation and data preparation. Like existing AE detection works, only
images that are correctly classified by the corresponding target model are used to
generate AEs in our experiments. To generate targeted AEs, we designate the next
class as the target class, similar to many other AE detection works [17, 24, 28].
Only AEs that can successfully fool the target models are used in the evaluation.
For ImageNet, we collect 30,000 legitimate images and create 30,000 AEs: DeepFool
and CW-L2 generate 15,000 AEs each. The number of CW-L2 AEs with each given
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confidence level (i.e.,κ= 0.0, 0.4, and 1.0) is the same, that is 5,000 for each subgroup. In the dataset, 80% of instances are used for training and the remaining 20%
for testing, denoted as DI -Train and DI -Test, respectively. Similarly, for CIFAR-10,
based on the types of target model, we have four dis-joint datasets, DC -CarliniTrain, DC -Carlini-Test, DC -ResNet-Train, and DC -ResNet-Test. The former two
and the latter two datasets have the same size and data composition as DI -Train and
DI -Test, respectively. All AEs are generated using the opensource tool Foolbox [29].
Inpainting algorithm. The inpainting algorithm we choose in this work is designed
by Telea [22]. This inpainting algorithm needs to solve an Eikonal equation, which
is rarely differentiable everywhere. Considering the inpainting algorithm is not fully
differentiable, it results in a non-negligible obstacle for adaptive attackers.
The experiments were performed on a computer running the Ubuntu 18.04 operating system with a 64-bit 3.6 GHz Intel® Core(TM) i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM and a
GeForce® GTX 1070 GPU.

2.3

The Proposed Approach

2.3.1

Our Insights

Effects of erasing (or adding noises) alone. Due to the optimization nature of
AE generation methods like CW and DeepFool, maliciously manipulated pixels in an
AE are deliberately selected and perturbed. Thus, each of the perturbed pixels plays
a certain role in the attack. By randomly erasing many pixels of an input image, it is
likely to corrupt some of the perturbed pixels or their surrounding pixels in an AE,
rendering the attack ineffective.
In the case of benign samples, however, the erasing operation, which is equivalent
to introducing random noises to images, will significantly degrade the accuracy of the
classifier. The close correlation between the image quality and the accuracy of image
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classification has been widely studied in previous works [30–32]. They mention that
neural networks are susceptible to random noise distortions. For example, Costa et
al. [31] point out that “noises can hinder classification performance considerably and
make classes harder to separate.”
Combining erasing and inpainting. We thus propose to apply inpainting after
the erasing operation. Inpainting is a category of techniques for restoring damaged
regions of images. Given an erased region, an inpainting technique infers and recovers
its original pixels. Our insight is that, while inpainting works very well for recovering
benign samples, its recovering effect is usually not what the AE attacker desires,
as the maliciously perturbed regions, once erased, can hardly be recovered to the
attacker-intended values.
We further design experiments to verify the two insights in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.2

Insights Verification

From CIFAR-10, we randomly select 1,000 images that can be correctly classified
by ResNet32. As shown in Figure 2.3(a), after randomly erasing 50∼150 (around
5%∼15%) of the pixels in each image, without inpainting, the classification accuracy
significantly degrades from 100% to the range from 24.2% (when erasing 15%) to
35.9% (when erasing 5%), which verifies that erasing alone harms the classification
accuracy for benign images significantly. By contrast, with inpainting applied, the
classification accuracy recovers to 90.5%∼96.6%.
Besides, for each benign image we use the CW algorithm to generate three AEs
with three different confidence levels (κ = 0.0, 0.4, and 1.0, respectively). All the
AEs successfully fool the ResNet32 model. As shown in Figure 2.3(b), after randomly
erasing 50∼150 (around 5%∼15%) of the pixels in each AE and then restoring them
using inpainting, the success rate of attacks dramatically decreases from the original
100% to the range 3.1%∼7.1%.
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Figure 2.3: Impacts of E&R on benign samples and AEs.
Similar results can be observed on the ImageNet dataset as well. (1) Specifically,
we randomly select 1,000 images from ImageNet that can be correctly classified by
the ResNet50 model. For example, after erasing and restoring 5% of the pixels in
each image, the classification accuracy stays at 96.3%. (2) On the other hand, when
we apply the same erasing and restoring operations to the 1,000 AEs generated from
these benign images, the success rate of attacks decreases from 100% to around 4.1%.
Therefore, it can be concluded that E&R has very small impacts on benign samples, but large impacts on AEs, demonstrating a noticeable contrast.

2.3.3

Approach Details

Based on our insights, we propose a novel AE detection technique, named E&R, that
exploits the sensitivity of AEs to E&R operations, and implement it in a system,
called Themis, as shown in Figure 2.4. (1) Given an input image I0 , we randomly
erase λ pixels of it to create a deteriorated image I. Employing the idea of sampling, this step is repeated for n times to obtain a sequence of deteriorated images
{I1 , I2 , · · · , In }. The intuition behind it is that even if an AE “luckily” evades the
detection once, it is very unlikely for it to hide itself throughout the multiple samples.
(2) Next, an inpainting technique is leveraged to produce a corresponding sequence
of restored images {I10 , I20 , · · · , In0 }. (3) Finally, we feed both the input image I0

14

and {I10 , I20 , · · · , In0 } into a neural-network classifier, and collect all the classification
results.
Erase & Restore
Input image

DNN

Classification
vectors

AE classifier

Benign

Feature vector
pre-processing
Adversarial

Figure 2.4: Architecture of Themis.
Given an image in CIFAR-10, its classification result is a vector ∈ R10 (since
there are 10 classes in the dataset). We simply concatenate all the classificationresult vectors for both I0 and {I10 , I20 , · · · , In0 } to obtain a feature vector ∈ R10×(n+1)
for training the AE classifier.
Given an image from the ImageNet, its classification result is a vector ∈ R1000
(since there are 1,000 classes in the dataset). Thus, the number of features to be
fed to our classifier is 1000 × (n + 1), which is too large. To make the training of
our classifier more feasible, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is performed on the
classification results of I0 and {I10 , I20 , · · · , In0 }, to reduce the dimensionality to a lower
value d. Unless otherwise specified, we set d to 10 (1% of the original dimensionality)
to keep consistent with CIFAR-10. Note that the number of principal components
should be less than both the number of features and the number of samples, when
solving PCA based on the truncated SVD (singular value decomposition). In our
case, the number of samples is n + 1; we thus let n = 11 (we discuss the impact of
n’s values with detailed experimental results in Section 2.4.3). We concatenate the
vectors of principal components for both I0 and {I10 , I20 , · · · , In0 } to obtain a feature
vector for training our classifier.
The value of the parameter λ (number of pixels to be erased) is set to 10% of
the pixels in an input image. We adopt this value for two reasons. (1) As shown in
Figure 2.3, when 10% of the pixels are erased and restored, it harms the success rate of
AEs most heavily, without degrading the classification accuracy for benign samples
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significantly. (2) The inpainting algorithm we adopt performs very well when the
portion of corrupted pixels in an image is less than 15% [22].
It is worth mentioning that λ = 10% leads to an enormous randomness pool.
Take an image in CIFAR-10 as an example, the size of which is 32×32: with λ=100
(≈ 10% of the pixels), the number of unique masks is around 7.7×10140 . It is thus
very unlikely for an adaptive attacker to correctly predict which masks will be used
by our detector.
We train our AE classifier using two supervised learning techniques: AdaBoost [33]
and SVM [34].

2.4

Evaluation

We evaluate the detection performance of the proposed scheme against L2 attacks in
terms of detection rate and false positive rate (FPR). The detection rate is defined
as the ratio of the number of successfully detected AEs to the total number of AEs.
FPR refers to the fraction of benign samples that are misclassified as AEs.

2.4.1

Detection Performance

We use DI -Train, DC -Carlini-Train, and DC -ResNet-Train (see Section 2.2) to
train our detectors and evaluate them based on the corresponding testing sets.
CW-L2 attacks. As shown in Table 2.1, the proposed technique achieves very high
detection rates (up to 100% on CIFAR-10, and 99.3% on ImageNet) with low FPR
values. The results are stable across different target models, confidence levels, and
classification methods.
In addition to SVM and Adaboost, we also train a fully connected neural network
as the AE classifier, and obtain very similar results. It shows that it does not affect
the performance by using a more sophisticated classifier. It also indicates that the
effect of E&R does not depend on a specific classifier type.
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Table 2.1: Performance of Themis.1
Dataset

Target
Model
Carlini

CIFAR-10
ResNet32
ImageNet

ResNet50

Classifier

FPR

SVM
AdaBoost
SVM
AdaBoost
SVM
AdaBoost

0.6%
0.0%
2.8%
0.9%
3.5%
2.7%

DR: CW-L2
κ=0.0
κ=0.4
κ=1.0
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
99.4%
99.6%
99.6%
99.4%
99.2%
99.4%
97.9%
98.4%
98.7%
98.9%
99.2%
99.3%

DR:
DeepFool
99.4%
98.3%
99.8%
99.8%
93.7%
95.0%

1 After

Themis is trained using training datasets that contain benign samples, CW
and DeepFool AEs, the DR (Detection Rate) and FPR (the rate of benign samples
misclassified as AEs) are measured using testing sets.

DeepFool attacks. For another leading L2 AE generation algorithm—DeepFool
(see Section 1.2.4), we observe very similar results as CW-L2 . Table 2.1 shows that
our detector achieves very high detection rates (up to 99.8% on CIFAR-10, and 95.0%
on ImageNet) with low FPR values.
Comparison with baseline. To illustrate the the benefits of the Telea inpainting
algorithm used in our detector, we compare it with a baseline method, which uses
a median filter to recover the damaged pixels. In particular, the window size of our
median filter is 3×3, which is also adopted by Feature Squeezing [17]. Without loss
of of generality, the datasets we use are DC -ResNet-Train and DC -ResNet-Test. We
replace the Telea inpainting with the median filter in our implementation to build a
baseline detector. Figure 2.5 shows the comparison result using ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curves of the different detectors. As shown in Figure 2.5(a),
when SVM is used as the classifier, the AUC value declines from 99.54% to 91.64%.
Similarly, as shown in Figure 2.5(b), when AdaBoost is used, the AUC value correspondingly declines from 99.89% to 93.72%. Thus, a high-quality inpainting method
is closely related to the final performance of our AE detector.
Comparison with prior work. As summarized in Table 2.2, we compare Themis
with some state-of-the-art AE detectors—NIC [24], LID [25], and Feature Squeez-
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Figure 2.5: ROC curves.
ing [17]. For CW-L2 attack, their experiments only examine κ = 0.0, which is the
default setting, so we also list the results under κ = 0.0 in Table 2.2 (see Table 2.1 for
the results of our detector under other κ values). We take NIC as an example here.
With respect to CIFAR-10, NIC obtains the detection rate 96% (see Table I in [24]),
while our system achieves the detection rate 100%. With respect to ImageNet, the
detection rate of NIC is 96% (see Table I in [24]), while our detection rate is 98.9%.
In terms of DeepFool, Themis also outperforms other AE detectors. When considering CIFAR-10, our system obtains the detection rate 99.4%, while NIC [24] obtains
the detection rate 91.0% (see Table I in [24]). Similarly, when considering ImageNet,
Themis can achieve the detection rate 95.0%, that is superior to NIC, the detection
rate of which is 92%.
Table 2.2: Comparison with other AE detectors (DR: Detection Rate).1
Dataset
Detector
FPR
DR: CW-L2
DR: DFool
1 We

Themis
0.6%
100%
99.4%

CIFAR-10
NIC
FS
4.2% 5.6%
96% 100%
91%
77%

LID
4.9%
86%
84%

Themis
2.7%
98.9%
95.0%

ImageNet
NIC
FS
14.6% 8.3%
96%
92%
92%
79%

use the same attack settings as used in prior work [17, 24].
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LID
14.5%
78%
83%

More importantly, from the angle of FPR, the performance of Themis is significantly better than other detectors. For example, when considering CIFAR-10, the
FPR of NIC is 4.2%, while ours is 0.6%. Moreover, when considering ImageNet,
the FPR of NIC is 14.6%, while ours is only 2.7%. It is worth noting that the distribution of adversarial and benign images is not balanced in practice—most inputs
should be benign. Thus, FPR is a very important metric to evaluate the model performance: a lower FPR indicates that the system makes fewer mistakes for benign
images. Themis is able to keep both a high detection rate and a very low FPR.
2.4.2

Notable Characteristics

Target-model agnostic. We are interested in finding out whether a detector trained
using AEs targeting one model can be directly used to detect AEs targeting another—
that is, whether it is target-model agnostic. We thus train our system using CW-L2
AEs in DC -Carlini-Train, and test it using CW-L2 AEs in DC -ResNet-Test.
Table 2.3: Target-model agnostic property of Themis.
Target Model
(Train → Test)
Carlini→ResNet32
ResNet32→Carlini

Classifier
SVM
AdaBoost
SVM
AdaBoost

Detection Rate
κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0
100% 100% 100%
97.9% 97.9% 98.2%
99.9% 99.9% 99.8%
99.7% 99.8% 99.6%

As Table 2.3 shows, the detection rate is as high as 100%. We then train the
system using CW-L2 AEs in DC -ResNet-Train, and test it using CW-L2 AEs in
DC -Carlini-Test; the detection rate is as high as 99.9%.
Therefore, this experiment not only confirms that Themis is target-model agnostic, but also demonstrates that Themis has low risk of overfitting.
Transferability. We are also interested in the transferability of our detector—
whether Themis trained on one type of AEs can be directly applied to detect another
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type of AEs that are unseen during training. To verify it, we train Themis using
CW-L2 AEs in DC -Carlini-Train, without loss of generality. Then, we test the
trained system using DeepFool AEs in DC -ResNet-Test and DC -Carlini-Test , and
our system can achieve detection rates 97.1% and 96.2%, respectively. Thus, we
can conclude the proposed technique has very good transferability, that is, it keeps
effective in handling unseen AE generation methods.
Explanation. The two notable properties of Themis—target-model agnostic and
good transferability—can be attributed to the unique advantage of the proposed
approach: benign samples and AEs show distinct sensitivities to the E&R operations,
which do not depend on the target model and the attack method.

2.4.3

Value Selection for the Parameter n.

We use n = 11 in the previous experiments. Here, we investigate the impacts of
different values of n on the detector’s performance. The CW-L2 AEs in DC -CarliniTrain, DC -ResNet-Train, and DI -Train are used in this experiment. For CIFAR-10,
which has only 10 classes (thus no PCA is needed), varying the value of n has little impacts. However, for ImageNet, the value of n has noticeable impacts: when
n increases, the AE detection rate increases and FPR decreases (see Table 2.4 and
Table 2.5 for more details). The reason is that by increasing n, more principal components can be extracted (see Section 4). However, when n > 11, the performance
improvement is negligible, probably because the extra principal components do not
provide useful features for AE detection. Therefore, we adopt n = 11.

2.4.4

Efficiency of Themis

We investigate the efficiency of the proposed technique on ImageNet because largesized images consume more processing time. For a single image, ResNet50 needs
approximately 1.076 seconds for classification. Since parallel computing is supported
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Carlini
ResNet32
Carlini
ResNet32
Carlini
ResNet32

n=
n=
5
7

ResNet32

0.4%
0.0%
3.6%
0.9%
0.4%
0.0%
3.3%
0.7%
0.4%
0.0%
2.9%
0.9%
0.4%
0.0%
3.0%
0.7%
0.4%
0.0%
2.8%
0.8%

n=

Carlini

SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost

Detection Rate
κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0
100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 99.9%
99.6% 99.6% 99.6%
99.2% 99.1% 98.5%
100% 100% 100%
100% 99.9% 99.9%
99.6% 99.6% 99.6%
99.2% 99.1% 99.0%
100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 99.8%
99.6% 99.7% 99.7%
99.3% 99.1% 98.9%
100% 100% 100%
100% 100% 99.8%
99.7% 99.7% 99.7%
99.3% 99.3% 99.1%
100% 100% 100%
99.8% 99.9% 99.7%
99.6% 99.7% 99.7%
99.0% 99.2% 98.9%

n=
9

ResNet32

FPR

11

Carlini

Classifier

n=

Target
Model

3

Table 2.4: Impacts of different values of n (CIFAR-10).

5
7

n=
9

9.8%
6.6%
4.7%
2.8%
3.6%
2.1%
3.5%
2.0%
3.2%
1.4%

n=

ResNet50

SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost
SVM
Adaboost

Detection Rate
κ=0.0 κ=0.4 κ=1.0
95.4% 95.1% 95.5%
93.1% 91.4% 93.8%
95.5% 95.8% 97.3%
96.5% 97.6% 97.2%
97.6% 98.1% 98.2%
97.9% 98.6% 98.6%
97.6% 98.0% 98.3%
98.0% 98.4% 98.8%
97.6% 98.1% 98.5%
98.4% 98.5% 98.9%

n=

FPR

11

Classifier

n=

Target
Model

n=
3

Table 2.5: Impacts of different values of n (ImageNet).

by GPU, given a relatively small number of images as inputs (e.g., n = 11), it takes
similar time to generate the classification vectors for them. Apart from this, to detect
AE, our method brings additional 1.01 seconds by average. In detail, it consumes
0.264 seconds for the inpainting, 0.744 seconds for the PCA-based dimension reduc-
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tion, and 0.002 seconds for the final prediction (taking SVM as an example). In short,
our detector causes a small delay.

2.5

Resilience to Adaptive Attacks

In an adaptive attack threat model, an adversary knows the existence and internal
details of our detector and adapts the attacks to bypass the detection. We thus seek
to study the resilience of Themis to adaptive attacks.
An AE detector can be categorized as either differentiable or non-differentiable.
Several previous works propose defense mechanisms that apply differentiable transformations to an image before detection or classification [15, 35–37]. But attackers
can circumvent these differentiable defenses by “differentiating through them”—i.e.,
by taking the gradient of a class probability regarding input pixels through both the
CNN and the transformation [18, 20, 38]. This strategy, however, is inapplicable to
bypassing Themis. Due to the random-erasing and inpainting-based restoring, our
approach is not only non-differentiable but involves tremendous randomness.
To bypass non-differentiable defences, Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) is proposed [39]. To handle defenses that employ randomized transformation to the input (like ours), it applies Expectation over Transformation [40] to
compute the gradient over the expected transformation to the input. However, in
our approach the erased pixels are randomly selected among all the image pixels, and
there are around 7.7×10140 unique masks (even for a small image; see Section 2.3.3);
thus, it is infeasible to calculate the expected transformation. Moreover, Themis is
not only randomized but also non-differentiable; in this case, it is unknown how to
apply BPDA to bypassing Themis.
Adaptive AE generation. He et al. [18] describe a representative adaptive attack
method against non-differentiable defences, where an attacker tries to circumvent the
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defensive approach by (a) considering intermediate distorted images during optimization and (b) exploring multiple diverse optimization paths.
Inspired by [18], we design similar adaptive attacks to examine the resilience of
our approach. To that end, we modify the code of the CW algorithm [9], in order
to adaptively generate AEs that can bypass our detector. Specifically, after each
iteration in an optimization procedure, an intermediate distorted image is obtained.
We then check whether it can bypass our detector. For each image, we repeat the
optimization procedure for up to T times to explore different optimization paths (for
this purpose, we set a randomly initialized state at the beginning of each optimization
procedure). As shown in Figure 2.6, we set T = 150, corresponding to around 450
seconds on average on our machine. In comparison, the two works [37] and [18] use
around 75 and 180 seconds to generate adaptive AEs for each image, respectively.
Given that adaptive CW AE generation is quite time-consuming, without loss
of generality, this experiment is conducted on 500 images randomly selected from
CIFAR-10. During the AE generation, we let κ = 0.0, which means that the resulting
AE is classified as the target class. As κ increases, the model classifies the resulting
AE as the attacker-desired label more likely. As a larger value of κ imposes an extra
constraint to attackers and lowers the chance of successful adaptive attacks, we only
consider κ = 0.0.
Resilience results. We adopt the SVM-based detector that achieves a detection
rate of 100% (Table 2.1): no AEs can fool it without adaptive attacks. Figure 2.6
shows that only 4.2% (that is, 21 AEs) of adaptive AEs can bypass our detector.
By contrast, similar adaptive attacks [18] can bypass feature squeezing based AE
detection [17] at a success rate of 100%; as another example, [37] can merely achieve
a detection rate of 70% under adaptive CW attacks. More importantly, the first 50
times of the optimization path exploration attain the success rate of 3.4%, while the
following 100 times only increase the success rate by 0.8%. It shows that the effect
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Figure 2.6: Success ratio of adaptive AEs.

of adaptive attacks grows very slowly as the attacker doubles his time. We thus
can conclude that our detection technique is not only resilient to adaptive attacks
based on differentiation, but also to adaptive attacks through exploration of many
optimization paths. Thus, Themis, highly resilient to adaptive CW-L2 attacks, fills
a critical gap in AE detection.

2.6

Interpretability

Background. To make the final prediction, most neural-network-based image classifiers implement a softmax function at the last layer
e zi
sof tmax(z)i = PK
j=1

e zj

,
(2.1)

for i = 1, · · · , K and z = (z1 , · · · , zK ) ∈ RK
which maps an input vector z consisting K real numbers to a probability mass function over predicted output classes. The input vector of a softmax function is also
called logit. Given a benign image whose logit is z, the goal of an attacker is to
perturb the image to get a new logit z0 such that argmaxi (z0 ) 6= argmaxi (z).
Interpretation Using Classification Results. Let f (x) be the output of the
softmax layer of a neural network f when feeding the input x. Let T (x) be the
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output of processing x with E&R operations. If x is benign, since it is not sensitive
to E&R operations, the probability mass functions f (x) and f (T (x)) are similar. By
contrast, if x is an AE, f (x) is significantly different from f (T (x)), since AEs are
very sensitive to E&R operations. In short, if the sensitivity distinction between AEs
and benign samples is true, the divergence (or distance) between f (x) and f (T (x))
should reflect whether x is malicious or benign. We then adopt two widely used
metrics, Wasserstein distance (WD for short) [41] and Kullback-Leibler divergence
(KL for short) [42].
Decision boundary
E&R operations
Adversarial attack
Adversarial example
Benign image
Restored samples

Figure 2.7: Illustration of how E&R works.
As shown in Figure 2.7, we depict benign and adversarial examples by green
circles and blue squares, respectively. The arrows with dotted line represent E&R
operations. We consider the changes caused by E&R operations on benign images
and AEs (depicted by green and blue arrows with dotted line, respectively) should fall
into different probability distributions. To visualize this, we randomly select 1,000
image pairs consisting of AEs and benign instances from DI -Test. After feeding them
(with and without applying E&R operations) into the image classification model, we
collect the output of the softmax layer. Then, we measure the difference between f (x)
and f (T (x)). To be consistent with the design of Themis, we apply E&R operations
10 times for each image and calculate an arithmetic mean of the 10 measurements.
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The visualization of samples is shown in Figure 2.8, which confirms our proposition;
that is, the changes caused by E&R operations on benign images and AEs fall into
different clusters.
Table 2.6: Clusters splitting result.
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Figure 2.8: Visualization of the changes caused by E&R on benign samples and AEs.
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Next, we quantitatively analyse to what extent the distance/divergence measurement can help discriminate an AE that is across the decision boundary. In detail,
we use an optimal threshold based on the ROC (receiver operating characteristic)
curve, to split AEs and benign images distributions. Table 2.6 presents the FPR and
TPR (i.e., Detection Rate defined in Section 2.4). Note that the results are only
for illustrating that E&R imposes different impacts on AEs and benign samples in
terms of probability mass function changes, and do not represent the detection performance of Themis (see Section 2.4 for its detection performance). Here, we only
use one dimensional feature (i.e., the Wasserstein distance or KL divergence) to split
two clusters, information loss inevitably degrades the splitting performance, which is
mitigated by the design of Themis.
Interpretation through Visualization of Feature Vectors. The feature vectors
due to 1,000 randomly selected benign samples from the ImageNet dataset and the
corresponding 1,000 AEs are visualized in Figure 2.9. For the visualization purpose,
it shows only three principal components of the pre-processed feature vectors (see
Figure 2.4). We have two observations. (1) While the feature vectors of benign
samples, before and after the E&R operations, are close (Figure 2.9(a)), those of AEs
form two clusters far apart (Figure 2.9(b)). (2) PCA is effective in preserving features
that help distinguish benign samples from AEs.

2.7

Related Work

Countermeasures against AE attacks can be roughly divided into two categories.
The first category aims to eliminate the influences of AEs by either rectifying them
or fortifying the target neural network itself. The second category is AE detectors
(including our work), the goal of which is to predict whether an input is adversarial,
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Figure 2.9: Visualization of feature vectors.1
so that the target neural network can reject those inputs. Given the large body of
research on AEs, this is not intended to be exhaustive.

2.7.1

Adversarial Influences Elimination

To improve the robustness of neural networks, adversarial training augments the
training set with the label-corrected AEs [43, 44]. Buckman et al. [45] propose using
thermometer-encoded inputs to assist adversarial training. Alternatively, Shield [46]
enhances a model by re-training it with multiple levels of compressed images using
JPEG, a commonly used image compression technique.
1

The coordinate axes respectively represent three largest principal components.
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Another strategy is to pre-process the inputs before feeding them to neural networks. For instance, the pixel deflection and a wavelet-based denoiser are combined
to rectify AEs [38]. Liao et al. [47] propose higher-level guided denoisers aiming to
remove the adversarial noise from inputs. Some other methods adopt JPEG compression techniques [48, 49] to filter out the information redundancy, which otherwise
provides living space for adversarial perturbations. However, their accuracies under
adaptive attacks are lack of adequate evaluations. CIIDefence [50] proposes to use image inpainting with wavelet based denoising to rectify the classification result. However, its inpainting mask is guided by class activation maps, which can be predicted
and exploited by an adaptive attacker. Both MagNet [16] and [51] essentially take
the path of removing noises/enhancing images, rather than the Erase-and-Restore
path proposed in this work. REMIX [51] applies inpainting to rectifying classification results, with an rectifying accuracy 86% on CIFAR-10. It uses autoencoder as
the inpainter. Autoencoders are typically data-specific, which means that it is only
effective on images similar to what they have been trained on. It did not study the
resilient to adaptive attacks and did not provide interpretation either.
Unlike all these works, the purpose of our work is for highly accurate attack
detection, e.g., an accuracy of over 98% on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. It does not have
dependency on high similarity between training data and testing data. It is targetmodel agnostic: a detector trained using AEs targeting one model can be directly
used to detect AEs targeting another. Moreover, our work provides interpretation
why the detection method works, and carefully examines its resilience to adaptive
attacks.

2.7.2

Adversarial Examples Detection

Li et al. [14] extract PCA features after inner convolutional layers of the DNN, and
then use a cascade classifier to detect AEs. Metzen et al. [15] train a CNN-based
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auxiliary network. This light-weight sub-network works with the target model to
detect AEs. Some techniques apply pre-processors on input images and use prediction
mismatch strategy to detect AEs. For example, Meng et al. [16] train an auto-encoder
as the image filter. If the predictions of an original image and the corresponding
processed one fail to match, the input is adversarial. Similarly, Xu et al. [17] propose
feature squeezing to detect AEs by comparing the prediction for the original input with
that for the squeezed one. However, adaptive attacks have successfully circumvented
all of the aforementioned detection methods [18–20]. Finally, Tian et al. [37] leverage
image rotation and shifting as pre-processors to construct a detector. Although these
operations can produce certain randomness to counter some adaptive attacks, their
randomness pool is very limited. It only has 45 possible transformations. As a result,
their method can merely achieve a detection rate of 70% under adaptive attacks [37].
Zeng et al. [52] proposes a novel AE detection method inspired by multiversion
programming, which first uses multiple off-the-shelf audio recognition systems to
classify the same audio input and then compares the classification results to detect
AEs. Their insight is the extraordinary difficulty of generating highly transferable
audio AEs, which is not the case for image AEs. We also make use of multiple
classification results, which, however, is based on the idea of sampling (i.e., applying
E&R multiple times) to enhance the detection accuracy.
Inpainting has been used in our prior AE detection work [28], but it was applied in
a different way. Specifically, [28] focuses on detecting L0 attacks by inpainting salient
noises, as L0 attacks usually cause large-amplitude perturbations due to minimizing
the number of modified pixels.
The AE detection idea that intentionally and randomly “damages” (i.e., erases)
some pixels of an image and then uses an inpainting algorithm is not only novel and
effective, but can also be interpreted and keep resilient to adaptive attacks. Unlike
other very complex methods, our method is extremely simple and easy to apply.
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Although it only handles L2 attacks, it can easily work as a plugin or complement to
enhance an existing attack detection system.

2.8

Summary

Our finding has revealed that L2 AEs are sensitive to the Erase-and-Restore operations, while benign samples are not. Exploiting the sensitivity distinction, we have
proposed a novel and effective AE detection approach E&R. It outperforms other
state-of-the-art approaches in terms of both high detection rates and low false positive rates. In addition, our detector is target-model agnostic, keeps effective across
different L2 attack methods (i.e., good transferability across attack methods), and is
resilient to adaptive attacks. Furthermore, we have interpreted the detection technique from both qualitative and quantitative angles to provide deeper understanding
of the technique. Unlike many other detection methods that are complex and thus
difficult to construct and train, this method is very simple to build and easy to apply
in practice.
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Chapter 3
Exploiting the Inherent Limitation of L0
Adversarial Examples
3.1

Introduction

In the last chapter, the proposed erasing and restoring approach works by destruction
of the carefully perturbed pixels. Attackers thus may consider minimizing the number
of perturbed pixels, like in L0 AEs, to evade our detection. This, however, essentially
becomes L0 -norm attacks, which are a category of widely discussed threats where
adversaries are restricted in the number of pixels that they can corrupt. Although
many AE detection methods [53–55] and defense techniques [46, 47, 56] have been
proposed, prior methods either are not very effective in handling L0 AEs or omit
discussing them. For example, feature squeezing [17] is capable of detecting L0 AEs.
However, He et al. [18] have shown that feature squeezers, either single or joint, are
not resilient to adaptive attacks. Previous work even argues that it is challenging to
recover the correct classification of L0 AEs by input transformation, as “it is very
difficult to properly reduce the effect of the heavy perturbation” [54].
We identify two characteristics of L0 AEs. By exploiting the two characteristics,
we build a detector based on a very simple architecture that achieves a high detection
accuracy. Moreover, a pre-processor based on these observations can effectively rectify
L0 AEs to recover the correct classifications.
The first characteristic is that it limits the number of modified pixels, but not the
amplitude of pixels. Thus, L0 attacks tend to introduce large-amplitude perturba-
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tions, especially for targeted attacks that aim to achieve an attacker-desired output
from a neural network. Second, as L0 attacks try to modify as few pixels as possible,
the optimization-based AE generation process tends to result in altered pixels that
scatter in the image. In other words, those corrupted parts are mostly small and
isolated regions. Both characteristics are verified by our experiments.
We accordingly propose a novel AE detection method. The main novelty is that
we convert the AE detection problem into a comparison problem. Specifically, the
architecture of the detector uses a Siamese network [57], which is known to be powerful
in comparison. Given an image I, it is processed by a pre-processor to obtain another
image I 0 . The Siamese network takes I and I 0 as the inputs and outputs whether
I is an AE. The advantage of the design is that the Siamese network is able to
automatically and precisely capture the discrepancies between the two inputs for AE
detection.
Another advantage is that the pre-processor used for AE detection can also work
as an effective defense by removing the influence of the adversarial perturbations.
Specifically, we propose an inpainting-based algorithm to process images, where inpainting refers to the process of reconstructing the lost or corrupted parts of an
image. The inpainting techniques are a fruitful sub-field in the area of digital image
processings [21–23], which have been widely used in practice. As we will show in Section 3.4.1, inpainting is more effective at eliminating the heavy perturbations created
by L0 attacks than previous defenses.
We implement a system AEPecker to demonstrate the advantages aforementioned and the weakness of L0 attacks. The system architecture is shown in Figure 3.1. After inputting an image I to a pre-processor P, we obtain another image
I 0 . Then, the Siamese network predicts whether I is adversarial by taking hI, I 0 i as
the input pair. If I is detected as an L0 AE, then we regard I 0 as a rectified image
and use it to replace I in subsequent image classification for the defense purpose.
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Figure 3.1: The architecture of AEPecker.

1

We have evaluated our system in terms of its detection and defense capabilities
using the popular image datasets CIFAR-10 and MNIST. Two leading L0 AE generation methods, JSMA [7] and CW-L0 [9], are both considered in the evaluation.
In the case of CIFAR-10 (we have similar results for MNIST), the evaluation results show that (1) the detection rate on the CW-L0 and JSMA attack is 97.1% and
99.7% respectively, both with a low false positive rate; (2) the proposed system has
outstanding transferability, as a detector trained only with JSMA AEs can detect
CW-L0 AEs with a high detection rate (99.4%), and vice versa; (3) the detection
is also attack-target-model agnostic (model agnostic, for short), since in the aforementioned experiments CW-L0 AEs and JSMA AEs actually target different image
classification models; and (4) our defense method recovers the classification accuracy
from 0% (when classifying those successful AEs) to 87.3% for CW-L0 , and from 0%
to 96.1% for JSMA, and meanwhile, has a very small impact on benign images.
Moreover, in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the Siamese network in detecting AEs, we experiment to use a preprocessing technique, bit depth reduction, that
is known to be weak. Feature squeezing [17] used it as one of the pre-processors and
obtained an AE detection rate 4.1%. In contrast, the Siamese network plus the weak
preprocessing technique achieves 99.6%, which demonstrates the unique advantage of
the Siamese architecture in detecting AEs.
1

If I is detected as an L0 AE, I 0 is used for image classification as a defense.
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To summarize, in this chapter, we point out the inherent characteristics of L0 AEs,
which typically contain high-amplitude perturbations to very few and isolated pixels,
and propose to exploit them to develop detection and defense techniques. In addition, we convert the L0 AE detection problem into an image comparison problem, and
propose to use a Siamese network to automatically extract the subtle discrepancies of
the input pair as features for the AE detection. The detector demonstrates multiple
prominent strengths, such as transferability across attacks and being attack-targetmodel agnostic (so the detector keeps effective across attack methods and target classifiers). More importantly, we propose an effective inpainting-based defense against
L0 perturbations, which can recover the correct classification at a high probability. To
the best of our knowledge, this defense method achieves the highest accuracy when
dealing with L0 AEs. Last but not least, adaptive attacks that try to bypass our
detection are considered and evaluated. The evaluation results show that our system
is resilient to them.

3.2

System Design

The proposed system consists of a Siamese network (Section 3.2.2) which determines
whether an input image is an L0 AE, and a pre-processor (Section 3.2.1) which also
can be used as a defense component to correct the classification under the existence of
L0 AEs. Note that the pre-processor has a very small impact on benign images; thus
it can be used as a defense component independently without relying on detection.

3.2.1

Pre-processor

The pre-processor adopted in our system is designed to reduce adversarial noises while
preserving the features in images to reduce false positives. From this perspective, the
proposed pre-processor can also be deployed as a defense against L0 attacks.
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Intuitively, failing to limit the amplitude of those altered pixels in the images will
result in outlier pixels. Previous work [54] emphasizes that it is challenging to get
rid of the effect of those heavy perturbations. However, we argue the outlier pixels
can be fixed by applying a processor based on inpainting. In image processing, the
term “inpainting” refers to the process of reconstructing lost or corrupted regions of
image data (or to remove small defects). Our idea is to treat those outliers as small
corrupted regions, and the inpainting technique exactly meets the need for eliminating
the L0 noise.
In detail, we observe that those L0 perturbations manifest themselves visually as
salient noises. A mask to determine which pixels should be reconstructed can help
identify these cases. When inspecting the pixel intensity in different color channels
(e.g., the R, G, B channels for color images), for an altered pixel, it is highly possible
that one extreme value can be observed in at least one channel. For example, an
original pixel is represented as an intensity vector [0.32, 0.56, 0.62], where all the
values are normalized. After corrupting by the L0 attack, it becomes [0.33, 0.55,
0.96], whose B channel has an extreme value 0.96. We define a value as extreme if it
is either smaller than an upper bound α or larger than an lower bound β. Thus, to
obtain such a mask, we first locate all pixels of which the intensity are exceptional
at least one channel. Meanwhile, we noticed that such pixels that achieve extreme
values in all of the three channels are often the bright parts such as the sky in a
natural image. Therefore, we use a parameter γ to help filter out such pixels in color
images. According to our observation, we choose γ = 0.7 as an empirical value. Lines
4-10 in Algorithm 1 show the procedures to initially create the mask.
In addition, considering that the number of altered pixels only occupies a small
portion of the image, the possibility that most of the altered pixels will assemble to
form a connected region is very low. Consequently, to further exclude those unlikely
candidates, we will remove those relatively large connected regions from the mask.
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Algorithm 1: The Pre-processor based on Inpainting.
Input: A color image I;
two bounds α and β used to find extreme values;
a parameter γ to describe bright pixels in natural images;
a structuring element E of the specified size and shape.
Output: A processed color image, denoted by S.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Normalize I ← [min(I) − I]/[min(I) − max(I)];
Extract three channels (I R , I G , I B ) from I;
Initialize the masks MR , MG , MB ← {0};
for each pixel Ii ∈ I, do
if (IiR < α) ∨ [(IiR > β) ∧ (IiG ≤ γ ∨ IiB ≤ γ)] then
MR
i ← 1;
if (IiG < α) ∨ [(IiG > β) ∧ (IiR ≤ γ ∨ IiB ≤ γ)] then
MG
i ← 1;
if (IiB < α) ∨ [(IiB > β) ∧ (IiG ≤ γ ∨ IiR ≤ γ)] then
MB
i ← 1;
for each pixel Mχi ∈ Mχ , where χ := R, G, B, do
if ∃ N (Mχi ) > E, s.t. Mχj = 1 ∧ Mχj ∈ N (Mχi ) then
Mχj ← 0;
for each I χ := I R , I G , I B , do
S χ ←Inpainting I χ according to Mχ ;
Reconstruct S with S R , S G and S B ;
return S.

Specifically, we use a structuring element E to describe a connected region with the
specified size and shape. If a connected region is larger than E, we will exclude such
region from the mask, as Lines 11-13 in Algorithm 1 show, where N (·) denotes a
connected neighborhood.
We thus independently produce an inpainting mask for each channel of a color
image. We then take advantage of the inpainting method proposed in [22] to restore
those deteriorated pixels for each channel, as Lines 14-15 in Algorithm 1 show. Figure 3.2 displays some concrete examples applying Algorithm 1 with α = 0.2, β = 0.8
on CIFAR-10. The resultant images in the even numbered row show that the adversarial perturbations are almost completely eliminated. We will provide more detailed
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experimental results to demonstrate how our defense influences the effectiveness of

Inpaint

JSMA

Inpaint

CW-L0

L0 attacks in Section 3.4.

Figure 3.2: Defense based on inpainting.2
The algorithm for gray images is very similar to Algorithm 1, but we only need
to consider one channel rather than three. Thus, we can consider the algorithm for
gray images as a special case of the algorithm for color images.
Parameters selection. At beginning, our algorithm normalizes the value of all
input pixels, such that their values are in the range of [0, 1]. (1) α is the upper bound
of extremely small values; thus, the value of α should be small (e.g. less than 0.2).
(2) β is the lower bound of extremely large values; thus, it should be relatively large
(e.g. 0.7 at least). Different parameters settings slightly affect the effectiveness of
rectifying AEs. We show the experiment results in Section 3.4.1. (3) In addition, as
aforementioned, we use a parameter, γ, to help filter out the normal bright parts in
a natural image. The term atmospheric light refers to those pixels, which has been
discussed in detailed in the field of image processing [58]. Based on our experience, in
2

The first and third rows show the CW-L0 and JSMA attack applied to CIFAR-10 images,
respectively. The second and fourth rows show the corresponding resulting images after inpainting.
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our experiment (Section 3.4), the value of γ is set to 0.7. (4) Finally, the structuring
element E is closely related to the restoration capability of the inpainting algorithm
and the size of input images. The corrupted region that can be restored by the widely
used inpainting algorithms is not only a single pixel but also a small patch [21–23].
However, as the size of patch increases, the restoration effect usually degrades. A
recommendation size of E given by [22] ranges from three to ten pixels. Note that
the performance of the pre-processor has little impact on the detection accuracy of
AEPecker, as demonstrated in our evaluation (see Section 3.4.2.3).
3.2.2

Siamese Network-Based Detector

As a classic category of neural network architecture, Siamese networks [57] are widely
applied among those tasks that involve detecting similarities or other relationships
between two or more comparable things [59]. In general, a Siamese network consists
of two sub-networks which share one identical architecture with the same weights.
Given an input image I, when pre-processing is adopted, the input image I and
the pre-processed one I 0 may be very different even if I is benign. On the other hand,
the discrepancy between the two images, I and I 0 , may not be simply described using
a single value and compared with a threshold, as adopted by feature squeezing [17].
These are the main challenges in devising an accurate detection technique.
We propose a Siamese-based L0 AE detector with the help of a pre-processor,
which converts the AE detection problem into an image comparison problem. Once
the model with fine tuned weights is established (via training), the discrepancy between I and I 0 can be extracted by the Siamese network. Taking the discrepancies
as features, the model can predict whether the input image is adversarial or not.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the architecture of our Siamese network-based AE detector.
In particular, we learn from the classical AlexNet [60] to design our CNN-based subnetworks but only use a shallow network. The purpose is to explore how well the AE
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Figure 3.3: The architecture of a Siamese network which is used as our AE detector.
detector performs even when it only uses a simple network design. The details of the
sub-network employed by each twin in the Siamese network are as follows:
CNN : → conv(3 × 3, 64) → ReLU
→ conv(3 × 3, 64) → ReLU
→ maxpool(2 × 2) → dropout(0.3)
→ F latten
→ linear(__, 128) → ReLU → dropout(0.5)
→ linear(128, 10) → sof tmax.

Figure 3.4 elaborates the training phrase of the proposed detector based on a Siamese
network. Given an image I and its pre-processed version I 0 , the Siamese network
takes hI, I 0 i as inputs, where the label is 0 if I is not an AE (denoted as Io ), or 1 if
I is an AE (denoted as Ia ). Although it is difficult to use a formula to describe the
discrepancy between the input pair hIa , Ia0 i and the consistency between hIo , Io0 i, the
Siamese network is effective in learning such relationship. Moreover, the consistency
and discrepancy can be learned even when a non-powerful pre-processor is adopted,
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Figure 3.4: Training phrase of the AE detector based on a Siamese network.
such as a bit depth reducer (see Section 3.4.2.3). The result of the last layer of each
of the two sub-networks is fed to a contrastive loss function [61]:
1
1
(1 − Y ) (DW )2 + (Y ) {(max(0, m − DW )}2
2
2
where DW is defined as the Euclidean distance between the outputs of the two subnetworks, Y is a binary label assigned to the input pair, and m > 0 is a margin used
to define a radius around the output of one of the sub-networks. Finally, once the
model is successfully trained, the Siamese network can be used to determine whether
I is an AE.
Our evaluation shows that, even with a relatively small training dataset and a
network with very few layers, our detector can still achieve a very high accuracy.

3.3

Experimental Setup

In this section, we describe the experimental settings and implementation (Section 3.3.1) and discuss the datasets used in our evaluation (Section 3.3.2).

3.3.1

Experimental Settings

Threat model. We assume attackers have full knowledge on a trained target image
classification model, but no ability to influence that model. Thus, given a trained tar-
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get model, attackers can use the L0 attacks including JSMA and CW-L0 to generate
AEs that will be misclassified by the target model.
Target models. We use two popular datasets for the image classification task:
MNIST and CIFAR-10. For each dataset, we build up two individual models for
the two types of L0 attacks. Specifically, for MNIST, we set up a CNN-based classifier [62] for JSMA, and reuse the model structure provided in [9]—which we denote as
CarliniM —for CW-L0 . For CIFAR-10, we select the 32-layered ResNet model based
on a residual learning framework [26] for JSMA, and reuse the model structure given
in [9]—which we denote as CarliniC —for CW-L0 . All the target models are trained
from scratch.
Table 3.1: Classification accuracy of the target models.
Dataset
MNIST
CIFAR–10

Target Model
CarliniM [9]
CNN [62]
CarliniC [9]
ResNet [26]

Accuracy
99.26%
99.52%
78.86%
91.96%

Table 3.1 summarizes the classification accuracy on the testing data of each model.
The accuracy of CarliniM and the CNN target model for MNIST is 99.26% and
99.52%, respectively; and the accuracy of CarliniC and the ResNet model for CIFAR10 is 78.86% and 91.96%, respectively. Note that only those images which can be
correctly classified by the corresponding target models are used to generate AEs in
the following experiments.
Attacks. For the target models CarliniM and CarliniC , we reuse the code provided
in [9] to generate CW-L0 AEs. The default parameters settings suggested by Carlini
and Wagner [9] are as follows: the number of maximum iterations is 1000, the initial
constant is 0.001, and the largest constant is 26 . To compare with the state-of-theart works [17, 24], we follow these parameters settings. Furthermore, for the target
CNN and ResNet model, we generate AEs with JSMA by leveraging the Adversarial
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Robustness Toolbox (ART) [13]. We used the same parameters settings as [17, 24],
i.e., θ = 1, γ = 0.1. As both JSMA and CW-L0 are targeted attacks, we designate
the next class as the target class.
Table 3.2: Evaluation of the L0 attacks.
Dataset
MNIST
CIFAR–10

Attack
CW-L0 [9]
JSMA [7]
CW-L0 [9]
JSMA [7]

Success rate
100%
81.6%
100%
99.8%

Table 3.2 reports the results of the AEs. The success rate is defined as the probability that an adversary achieves their goal. For a targeted attack, it is only considered
a success if the model predicts the target class. Note that we only use the AEs that
can successfully attack the target models to evaluate the performance of our system
on detecting AEs.
Implementation. We implement our Siamese-based detector in Python using the
Keras [27] platform with TensorFlow [63] as backend. Keras provides a large number
of high-level neural network APIs and can run on top of TensorFlow. The Telea’s
inpainting algorithm [22] is implemented based on Open Source Computer Vision
Library (OpenCV) [64].
The experiments were performed on a computer running the Ubuntu 18.04 operating system with a 64-bit 3.6 GHz Intel® Core(TM) i7 CPU, 16 GB RAM and GeForce
GTX 1070 GPU.

3.3.2

Data Preparation

We generate AEs based on two image datasets, i.e., CIFAR-10 and MNIST.
CIFAR-10 contains 60,000 color images; each is assigned to one of ten different
classes, such as dog, frog and ship. CIFAR-10 is split into the training and testing
dataset, which contains 50,000 and 10,000 images, respectively.
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We first filter out those images that cannot be correctly classified by the corresponding target model. We then use the CW-L0 algorithm to generate AEs that can
successfully attack the CarliniC model [9], and create two dis-joint datasets, denoted
as DC -CWL0-Train and DC -CWL0-Test. In detail, DC -CWL0-Train contains 10,000
legitimate images and 10,000 AEs. DC -CWL0-Test contains 1,000 benign images and
1,000 AEs. Next, we follow the similar method on CIFAR-10 but instead using JSMA
to generate AEs based on ResNet classifier [26]. As a result, we obtain two dis-joint
datasets, denoted as DC -JSMA-Train and DC -JSMA-Test. There are 10,000 legitimate images and 10,000 AEs in training set. There are 1,000 legitimate images and
1,000 AEs in testing set.
MNIST contains 70,000 8-bit grayscale images of hand-written digits. Each image is assigned a label from 0 to 9. MNIST is split into the training and testing
dataset, which contains 60,000 and 10,000 images, respectively. We carry out similar procedures on MNIST to create a training and testing set but using different
target models. As a result, we have DM -CWL0-Train and DM -CWL0-Test based
on CarliniM model [9], as well as DM -JSMA-Train and DM -JSMA-Test based on
CNN [62] model. The sizes of these datasets are the same as their counterparts in
CIFAR-10. Considering that CIFAR-10 is a more challenging dataset compared with
MNIST, we will spend more space on explaining the results for CIFAR-10 in the
following experiments.
Note that all the aforementioned legitimate images can be classified correctly by the
target model, and all the AEs can successfully fool the corresponding target model.

3.4

Evaluation

In this section, we first evaluate the effect of our pre-processing method as a defense
alone (Section 3.4.1). Next we evaluate the accuracy of our system on detecting AEs
generated by JSMA and CW-L0 (Section 3.4.2), and the efficiency in terms of training
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and testing (Section 3.4.3). The resilience of our system against an adaptive attack
is presented in Section 3.5.

3.4.1

Effectiveness of Pre-processor as Defense

It is worth noting that our proposed method can not only detect adversarial examples but also rectify the classification results. Thus, this sub-section shows that our
pre-processor as a defense can individually and functionally rectify the classification
results of L0 AEs.
To mislead a classifier to predict a specific target class, the adversarial perturbations produced by an L0 attack such as JSMA or CW-L0 are introduced intentionally
instead of randomly. Moreover, the adversarial strength of an L0 attack limits the
number of pixels that can be manipulated; and as a result, the manipulated pixels
need to have significant changes. The proposed inpainting-based pre-processor is to
eliminate the possible adversarial pixels while preserving the benign ones. Therefore,
the inpainting-based pre-processor can also be considered as a defense against L0
attacks.
Inpainting-based pre-processor for color images. We first evaluate the effectiveness of the inpainting-based pre-processor as a defense against L0 attack on
CIFAR-10. The inpainting-based algorithm has two parameters: the threshold α extracts the pixels whose values tend to be very small, and β is used to screen all pixels
whose values tend to be extremely large. We use 1,000 AEs in DC -CWL0-Test to
evaluate the effectiveness of the inpainting-based pre-processor as a defense against
CW-L0 attacks and examine its performance with varying values of α and β. Without pre-processing, these AEs result in 0% classification accuracy when using the
CarliniC model [9]. After pre-processing, each recovered AE is analyzed by the model
to predict a class label. Table 3.3 shows the results. When α = 0.1 and β = 0.7, the

45

performance is the best—the classification accuracy on these AEs is increased from
0% to 87.3%.
Table 3.3: The classification accuracy on AEs in DC -CWL0 -Test after using
inpainting-based pre-processors.
α
β
0.6
0.7
0.8

0.0

0.1

0.2

81.3%
80.5%
76.0%

86.9%
87.3%
86.2%

84.2%
86.5%
86.5%

We then use 1,000 AEs in DC -JSMA-Test to evaluate the effectiveness of the
inpainting-based pre-processor as a defense against JSMA attack. Without preprocessing, these AEs result in 0% classification accuracy of the ResNet model [26].
After applying inpainting-based pre-processor to rectify those AEs, each recovered
AE is analyzed by the ResNet model to predict a class label. Table 3.4 shows the
results. We can see that when α = 0.0 and β = 0.8, the performance is the best—the
classification accuracy on these AEs is increased from 0% to 96.1%. This classification accuracy is higher than 87.3% given by the previous CarliniC model. Moreover,
the ResNet model is more robust against the benign perturbations introduced by the
inpainting procedure.
Table 3.4: The classification accuracy on AEs in DC -JSMA -Test after using
inpainting-based pre-processors.
α
β
0.6
0.7
0.8

0.0

0.1

0.2

90.0%
94.1%
96.1%

81.2%
88.8%
91.2%

63.2%
74.5%
77.3%

As a comparison, we examine the impact of both SVD compression and median
filter on AEs generated by L0 attacks. First, as a low-pass filter, SVD compression
is usually used to reduce noise in images. As shown in Table 3.5, when varying the
loss ratio of SVD compression, the classification accuracy on the processed AEs is
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very low—at most 44.5% and 27.4% for CW-L0 AEs and JSMA AEs, respectively.
Note that we only use those images which can be correctly classified by the target
model to generate AEs; thus the maximum classification accuracy given by the target model here is 100%. Therefore, the experiment suggests that the perceptible
perturbations introduced by an L0 attack are very difficult to be reduced when only
using the frequency domain filters. Alternatively, [17] and [49] claim that median
filter is particularly effective in mitigating adversarial examples generated by an L0
attack because such perturbations are very similar to salt-and-pepper noises. In our
experiments, after applying the median filter to process AEs in DC -CWL0-Test and
DC -JSMA-Test, the classification accuracy given by CarliniC and ResNet is 79.8%
and 85.3%, respectively; both are lower than the proposed defense.
Table 3.5: The classification accuracy on testing datasets after applying SVD compression.
Loss ratio
JSMA
CW-L0

60%
27.4%
44.5%

40%
17.9%
35.1%

20%
5.4%
21.4%

Inpainting-based pre-processor for gray images. We can observe similar results on MNIST when taking advantage of the inpainting-based pre-processor as a
defense against an L0 attack. Our experiment shows that processing the 1,000 AEs
in DM -CWL0-Test with the proposed inpainting-based method results in a significant
increase of the classification accuracy on the CarliniM model [9]—from 0% to 88.2%.
Similarly, after using the proposed inpainting-based method on the 1,000 AEs in
DM -JSMA-Test, the recovered AEs result in the classification accuracy on the CNN
model [62] to increase from 0% to 86.1%. All of the results above are obtained when
α = 0.1 and β = 0.8. When varying the value of α from 0.1 to 0.2 and the value of
β from 0.7 to 0.8, the classification accuracy increases slowly (84.9% at least).
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As a comparison, Bafna et al. [65] independently focus on the L0 attacks, and
propose a defense based on Fourier transform. But our approach outperforms theirs—
after applying their defense algorithm against CW-L0 , their classification accuracy
on the MNIST testing set is only 72.8%. Note that they did not conduct experiments
on standard color-image datasets such as CIFAR-10.
Impact on benign images. To investigate the impact of the defense methods
on benign images, we first carry out an experiment on the 1,000 benign images from
DC -JSMA-Test. Specifically, we use the ResNet model [26] to classify each color image
after the inpainting-based defense is applied. The classification accuracy on these
processed images only decreases from 100% to 95.6%. Next, we conduct a similar
experiment on the 1,000 benign images from DM -JSMA-Test. We use the CNN
model [62] to classify each gray image after the inpainting-based defense is applied.
As a result, the classification accuracy on these processed images only decreases from
100% to 99.7%. The results show that a very small impact is imposed on classifying
benign images.
Summary. Therefore, the proposed inpainting-based algorithm is effective in defending against L0 attacks such as CW-L0 and JSMA. Moreover, our defense methods
have a very small impact on benign images, which implies it can be directly applied
without relying on detection.

3.4.2

Detecting L0 Adversarial Inputs

In this sub-section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our system on detecting AEs
generated by L0 attacks, which demonstrates that the detector (i.e., pre-processor
plus the Siamese architecture) can effectively distinguish AEs from benign images.
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3.4.2.1

Detection Efficacy

We evaluate the detection performance of the proposed scheme against CW-L0 and
JSMA attack. The inpainting-based pre-processor is used to create input pairs to the
Siamese network.
Color images. The two training datasets, DC -CWL0-Train and DC -JSMA-Train, are
used to train our system individually for 200 epochs using early stopping configured
with a minimum accuracy change of 0.001 and 50 patience steps. If an accuracy
change is less than 0.001, we consider that there is no improvement of the model
performance; after 50 epochs with no improvement, the training is stopped. We save
the resulting models as the base models.

1.0
0.8 1.00
0.95
0.6 0.90
.00 .05 .10
0.4
JSMA, AUC=99.93%
0.2
CW-L0, AUC=99.84%
0.00.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate

True Positive Rate

True Positive Rate

1.0
0.8 1.00
0.95
0.6 0.90
.00 .05 .10
0.4
JSMA, AUC=99.94%
0.2
CW-L0, AUC=98.69%
0.00.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
(a) CIFAR-10

(b) MNIST

Figure 3.5: ROC curves for different datasets.
We now evaluate the detection accuracy of the base models against CW-L0 and
JSMA attack on DC -CWL0-Test and DC -JSMA-Test, respectively. Each dataset contains 1,000 benign images and 1,000 AEs. We plot the ROC (receiver operating
characteristic) curves, which are showed in Figure 3.5(a). We can achieve the AUC
values of 98.69% and 99.94% for the two L0 attacks. Table 3.6 shows more detailed
results evaluated on the testing set.
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We consider the adversarial images as positive, and the benign images as negative. Thus, the recall value (i.e., the detection rate) is the ratio of the number of
successfully detected AEs to the total number of AEs; and False Positive Rate (FPR)
is the fraction of the negative testing data (i.e., benign images) that is misclassified
as positive. In practice, the distribution of adversarial and benign images are not
balanced—most of the images should be benign. Thus, FPR is a very important
metric to evaluate the model performance; a lower FPR indicates that the system
makes fewer mistakes for benign images.
Table 3.6: The detection performance of the proposed system.
Dataset
CIFAR-10
MNIST

Attack
JSMA
CW-L0
JSMA
CW-L0

Accuracy
99.85%
95.80%
99.80%
99.40%

Precision
100.0%
94.64%
99.90%
99.30%

Recall
99.70%
97.10%
99.70%
99.50%

F1 Score
99.85%
95.85%
99.80%
99.40%

FPR
0.0%
5.5%
0.1%
0.7%

As shown in Table 3.6, when analyzing AEs generated by the CW-L0 attack, the
detection rate of DC -CWL0-Test is 97.1% and the FPR is 5.5%. When analyzing AEs
generated by the JSMA attack, the detection rate of DC -JSMA-Test is 99.7% and the
FPR is as low as 0.0%.
Gray images. We follow the same configurations to conduct an experiment on
MNIST. Because gray images only have one channel, training a Siamese network on
MNIST is simpler than that on CIFAR-10. We thus only train the detector for 100
epochs using an early stopping with 30 patience steps.
We evaluate the detection accuracy of the base models against CW-L0 and JSMA
attacks on DM -CWL0-Test and DM -JSMA-Test, respectively. We plot the ROC
curves as the Figure 3.5 (b) shows. The AUC value can achieve 99.84% and 99.93%.
In Table 3.6, we can observe similar results as the experiments given on CIFAR-10.
When facing CW-L0 attacks, the detection rate for the AEs from DM -CWL0-Test is
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99.5%, and the FPR is 0.7%. When facing JSMA attacks, the detection rate for the
AEs from DM -JSMA-Test can achieve 99.7%, and the FPR is as low as 0.1%.
Table 3.7: Comparison with state-of-the-art detectors in terms of FPR and detection
rate.
Dataset
CIFAR-10

MNIST

Detector
AEPecker
FS [17]
NIC [24]
AEPecker
FS [17]
NIC [24]

FPR
2.0%
4.9%
3.8%
0.4%
4.0%
3.7%

CW-L0
98.4%
98.1%
98.0%
99.1%
91.1%
100%

JSMA
99.5%
83.7%
94.0%
99.3%
100%
100%

Comparison. We compare the proposed system with the state-of-the-art AE detectors, including feature squeezing [17] and NIC [24]; both of them show that their
systems are able to effectively detect L0 AEs. Moreover, feature squeezing [17] uses
multiple feature squeezers, and we only compare our system with the best results of
their work. To this end, we train two comprehensive models for color images and
gray images, respectively. Specifically, for color images, we train the detector using
both DC -CWL0-Train and DC -JSMA-Train. For gray images, we train another detector using DM -CWL0-Train and DM -JSMA-Train. We summarize the adversarial
detection rate and FPR in Table 3.7. For CIFAR-10, the detection rate of feature
squeezing [17] on CW-L0 and JSMA attacks is 98.1% and 83.7%, respectively, and
its FPR—the percentage of the benign images among all the testing benign images
that is misclassified as positive—is 4.9%. NIC [24] can achieve the detection rate of
98.0% and 94.0% on CW-L0 and JSMA attacks respectively, and its FPR is 3.8%.
Our AEPecker outperforms theirs—we can achieve the detection rate of 98.4% and
99.5% for the two types of L0 attacks and our FPR is only 2.0%. With repect to
MNIST, the detection rate of our model is comparable with feature squeezing [17]
and NIC [24]. Moreover, AEPecker achieves the lowest FPR for both CIFAR-10
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and MNIST. Therefore, our proposed detector outperforms the two state-of-the-art
detectors.

3.4.2.2

Transferability

This experiment is to evaluate the transferability of our system: whether our system
trained on one type of L0 AEs can be directly applied to detect another type of L0
AEs that have not been seen during training without any adaptation. To this end, we
train our system using DC -JSMA-Train and use DC -CWL0-Test to test the detector.
The result shows that the detection rate is as high as 99.4%. Similarly, we train our
system using DC -CWL0-Train and use DC -JSMA-Test to test the detector. The result
shows that the detection rate is as high as 98.7%.
The similar results are obtained for MNIST: if we use DM -JSMA-Train to train
the Siamese network and use DM -CWL0-Test to test the detector, the detection rate is
96.3%; if our system is tained using DM -CWL0-Train and tested on DM -JSMA-Test,
the detection rate can achieve 95.4%.
Summary. Therefore, our system has good transferability; our system trained on
AEs generated by one L0 attack can be directly applied to detect AEs generated by
another L0 attack without any adaptation.

3.4.2.3

Pre-processor Study

We next conduct an experiment to examine the impact of the pre-processor; specifically, we would like to see what the detection accuracy will be if a weak pre-processor
is adopted. The weak here means the manipulated AEs through such a pre-processor
still cannot be classified correctly by the target model with a high possibility. Through
this, we will show that even with a weak pre-process, our system can still achieve a
high detection accuracy—this means that a perfect pre-processor is unnecessary for
our Siamese-based detector to achieve a high success rate of detection.

52

Without loss of generality, we use color images as an example for the following
discussion. For color images such as CIFAR-10, each channel of RGB is encoded by
8 bits. As Figure 3.6 shows, we can reduce the original 8 bits to fewer bits without
influencing the image recognizability for human eyes. Figure 3.6 also shows that it
is very difficult to remove those striking adversarial perturbations introduced by L0
attacks only with such an approach. Moreover, the original L0 AEs can mislead the
target neural networks to a classification accuracy of 0%. After applying bit depth reduction, the classification accuracy for AEs in the testing datasets is calculated. The
experiment results are shown in Table 3.8, which suggest that processing the AEs
generated by JSMA and CW-L0 with bit depth reduction cannot increase the classification accuracy of the target model. Therefore, the bit depth reduction approach
only has a very limited capability to defend against L0 attacks.

4

5

3

2

JSMA

CW-L0

Benign

Original

Figure 3.6: Image examples from CIFAR-10 after applying bit depth reduction.3
We thus choose the bit depth reduction as a weak pre-processor for color images.
The experiment results show that even when a weak pre-processor (such as bit depth
3

Given the different numbers of bit depth, the first row displays a benign image and its processed
versions; the second row displays an AE generated by CW-L0 and its corresponding processed
images; the third row displays an AE generated by JSMA and its corresponding processed images.
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reduction) is applied, our Siamese-based detector still can achieve a very good performance. The detection rates for AEs generated by JSMA and CW-L0 are 99.6% and
99.4%, respectively; and the FPR is 2.1%. Xu et al. also use bit depth reduction as
a pre-processor [17]; however, the best detection rates provided by their system for
AEs generated by JSMA and CW-L0 are 4.1% and 36.5% respectively, and its FPR
is 5%.
Table 3.8: The classification accuracy for AEs in testing datasets after applying bit
depth reduction.
Datasets
DC -JSMA-Test
DC -CWL0-Test

2-bit
22.2%
51.2%

Bit Depth
3-bit
4-bit
27.1% 21.2%
56.6% 55.1%

5-bit
12.0%
51.5%

Summary. Therefore, our proposed Siamese-based detector outperforms the stateof-the-art method when using the same weak pre-processor. The result also demonstrates that the good performance of our detector does not rely on a perfect preprocessor, but is due to the Siamese network design.

3.4.3

Efficiency

Training time. It is widely known that neural networks usually require a large
amount of data and time for training. However, as our sub-networks employed within
the Siamese architecture are quite simple and shallow, the training is very efficient.
For example, for DM -JSMA-Train and DC -JSMA-Train, each epoch with 20,000 images (10,000 benign images and 10,000 AEs) only takes 5 and 7 seconds, respectively.
On the other hand, due to the simple and shallow sub-networks, with a relatively
small training set, our Siamese neural-network-based AEPecker can still achieve
high detection accuracies (Section 3.4.2). Moreover, the training time is linear with
respect to the number of epochs and the number of training samples for each epoch.
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Our experiment results show that our system trained on CIFAR-10 and MNIST
can converge very quickly and achieve high accuracy within 100 and 200 epochs,
respectively—thus, the training only requires around 8 minutes and 23 minutes, respectively.
Testing time. The trained detector can detect an AE very fast. For example,
AEPecker only takes approximately 0.5ms on average to detect whether an image
from CIFAR-10 is adversarial or not.

3.5

Resilience to Adaptive Attack

An adversary who knows the details of AEPecker will try to adapt the attacks.
Thus, we seek to understand the resilience of AEPecker to adaptive attacks by
answering the following questions. (Q1) What is the percentage of the high-amplitude
altered pixels in AEs generated using non-adaptive L0 attacks? Exploration of this
question not only helps us understand L0 attacks and why the proposed detection
and defense techniques work well, but also guides the adversary to adapt L0 attacks.
(Q2) How difficult is it for an adversary to adaptively generate L0 AEs that bypass
our detection?
To answer these questions, we launch an adaptive L0 attack by adopting a similar
method described in [18], which has successfully demonstrated a capability to impede
feature squeezing [17]. Our implementation is based on the source code given by [9].
To generate L0 AEs, after each step of stochastic gradient descent (SGD), an intermediate distorted image is generated as a resolution of the optimizer. Each time the
optimizer runs, the process tries to minimizes the number of altered pixels and, in
the meanwhile, keep the targeted attack successful.
Answer to Q1. Let NA be the number of altered pixels and NE the number of
such altered pixels that possess extreme values (i.e., values smaller than α or larger
than β). We consider the ratio ρ = NE /NA as an indicator showing the percentage
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Figure 3.7: L0 attacks are launched on 100 randomly selected images from CIFAR-10.
For each of the last 10 optimization steps, we examine the average ratio ρ̄ of the 100
intermediate distorted images.
of pixels with large-amplitude perturbations, and want to understand how this ratio
changes in the AE generation process. As an empirical analysis, we carry out SGD
step by step on 100 randomly selected images from CIFAR-10. For each of the last
10 steps, we calculate an average ratio ρ̄ value of the 100 intermediate images, as
shown in Figure 3.7. We observe that the average ratio ρ̄ goes higher and higher
as NA decreases. Finally, when the optimal resolution is found, around 90% of the
altered pixels by average possess extreme values. This helps understand why the
proposed technique works well, since it is designed to deal with such large-amplitude
perturbations by recovering these pixels.
An adversary who is aware of the details of the proposed technique thus should try
to control the amplitude of those altered pixels while satisfying the L0 optimization
target (i.e., minimizing NA ). Thus, given an image, we run the SGD multiple times;
once the value of ρ is over 80% (note this value finally can reach 90% by average),
we explore different optimization paths. The result shows that only 5% of the cases
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succeed to control the ratio ρ under 80%. Therefore, it is difficult to control the
amplitude of the altered pixels while satisfying the L0 optimization target.
Answer to Q2. We follow the procedures described in [18] to adaptively search
potential L0 AEs. Our design of the adaptive L0 attack is as follows. Since inpainting is used in both detection and defense, the adversary integrates it into the AE
generation; during the AE generation, the intermediate image at each step of the optimization procedure is processed using our inpainting pre-processor. Next, we check
whether the resulting image is a successful attack. If that it cannot successfully fool
the neural network, we iteratively run SGD multiple times (10 in our experiments)
until a resolution is found. We randomly select 100 color images from CIFAR-10, Our
experiments show that the final number of altered pixels only takes up less than 2%
of the total number of the pixels in images from CIFAR-10, which means that they
achieve the L0 optimization target. In order to save computational time, we start
checking and adaptive optimization after such percentage is lower than 5%. The
result finally shows that only 7% of cases can generate successful AEs to evade our
detection. In contrast, [18] shows that adaptive attacks using a similar method can
bypass feature squeezing [17] at 100%. Therefore, our method is much more resilient
than prior work.
Summary. Based on these explorations, we conclude that L0 attacks have an inherent limitation, and it is difficult for adaptive attacks to overcome the limitation
to bypass our detection.

3.6

Related Work

As an increasing number of adversarial example generation approaches have been
proposed in recent years, AE attacks are becoming a non-negligible threat to the
deep learning. Consequently, finding solutions which may protect DNNs against AE
attacks is of significance. Generally, the protection strategies against AE attacks fall
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into two groups, i.e., detection and defense. In this section, we will briefly review
them both.

3.6.1

Detecting Adversarial Examples

An AE detector is a binary classifier which is designed to distinguish an adversarial
sample from a legitimate one. There are two strategies which are often used to design
AE detectors, i.e., adversarial training and predication mismatch.
Detector Training. Some techniques use both AEs and legitimate images to train
a detector. For example, Li et al. [14] extract PCA features after inner convolutional
layers of the neural network, then use a cascade classifier to detect AEs. Metzen
et al. [15] use both adversarial and benign samples to train a CNN-based auxiliary
network. This light-weight sub-network works with the target model to detect AEs.
They usually require a large number of samples to train the model while we only need
a relatively small dataset. More importantly, our detector achieves a high detection
rate but low FPR for handling L0 AEs. In addition, Ruan et al. [66] provided an
empirical analysis and conclude that the model which is trained only through using
both adversarial and benign data usually shows poor performance because the normalrelated features and adversarial-related features are overlapped.
Prediction Mismatch. Feeding one benign image to different DNNs often gains
very similar prediction, while using one adversarial image as input, different models
may make distinct predictions. Based on this observation, the disagreement among
several models can be leveraged as a measurement to distinguish whether the input
sample is benign or adversarial. For example, Bagnall et al. [55] train an ensemble
of multiple models to use a rank voting mechanism to combine those outputs. In
this way, an ensemble disagreement can be used to detect adversarial examples. Bimodel [53] firstly employs two pre-trained distinct models to generate features, then
feeds the concatenated features to an additional binary classifier.
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Other works [16, 17, 37, 54] apply pre-processors on an input image. For example,
Meng et al. [16] train an auto-encoder as the image filter. Tian et al. [37] pre-process
the images with randomly rotation and shifting since adversarial examples are usually
sensitive to such transformation operations. Liang et al. [54] implement an adaptive
denoiser based on image entropy as the filter. Their methods then feed the original
image and the processed one to the same neural network–if the predictions of the
two images fail to match, the input is adversarial. In addition, Xu et al. [17] propose feature squeezing to detect AEs by comparing the prediction on original inputs
with that on the squeezed ones. However, the proposed detector outperforms feature
squeezing for handling L0 attacks. Note that the performance of their approach heavily relies on the effectiveness of the feature squeezing methods. On the contrary, our
Siamese-based detector does not rely on powerful pre-processing (see Section 3.4.2.3).
Our detection technique seems close to the approaches in the second category but
is actually very different. Rather than using a simple mismatch or a distance value
to describe the discrepancy between an AE and its manipulated image, our technique
uses a Siamese network to automatically extract the discrepancy between the two as
features for detection.

3.6.2

Defense

The primary task of defensive techniques is to alleviate or eliminate the influences
of AEs. In other words, with the help of defense, even facing attacks, those deep
learning models are still able to make correct predictions at a high possibility. In
general, the current defensive techniques can be grouped into two major categories,
that is, model enhancement and input transformation.
Model Enhancement. The first category improves the resilience of neural networks
by including AEs in the process of model training, i.e., adversarial training [6, 67].
However, this type of defense is usually less effective against black-box attacks than

59

white-box attacks considering the training only focuses on one certain neural network.
Also, Xu et al. claim that this kind of technique suffers high cost because of iterative
re-training with both adversarial and normal examples [17]. Alternatively, defensive
distillation is proposed, and can obstruct the neural networks from fitting too tightly
to the data [11]. However, the prior work [9] demonstrates that the approach can be
easily circumvented with a minimal modified attack such as a CW-L0 . Shield [46]
enhances a model by re-training it with multiple levels of compressed images based
upon JPEG. However, this method is still ineffective against L0 attacks.
Input Transformation. For the second category of defenses, researchers have
averted their eyes from neural networks to the adversarial inputs themselves. In
short, pre-processing the inputs before feeding them to networks is helpful for increasing the prediction accuracy even when facing adversarial examples. The reason
why adversarial examples could successfully fool the deep learning model without
being perceived is that attackers take advantage of the information redundancy of
images to add adversarial noise. Consequently, well designed filters or denoisers
can be considered a cure for adversarial images by removing unwanted noise. For
instance, Liao et al. [47] propose higher-level guided denoisers to remove the adversarial noise from inputs; however, their approach is computationally expensive and
their work does not show its effectiveness on L0 attacks. Some other methods adopt
compression techniques, such as PCA [68] and JPEG [48, 49, 69, 70], to filter out the
information redundancy which may provide living space for adversarial perturbations
in images; however, these approaches are not suitable for L0 attacks. Furthermore,
Bafna et al. [65] independently propose a defense against L0 attacks; but their Fouriertransform-based approach is not as effective as ours (see Section 3.4.1).
There exist some approaches that do not fall in either category. For example,
MVP-Ears [52] borrows the idea of multi-version programming from software engineering and applies it to audio AE detection. It deploys multiple diverse automatic
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speech recognition systems in parallel, and detects audio AEs by comparing their
recognition results. However, the idea will probably fail in handling image AEs,
which are known to have good transferability [6].

3.7

Summary

In the setting of classic L0 AE attacks, a bounded number of pixels can be corrupted
without limiting the amplitude. These large-amplitude perturbations in L0 AEs are
considered as a challenge by many previous works, since the effect of such corruptions
is difficult to eliminate. Considering the threats caused by L0 AEs, a highly accurate
detection technique and an effective defense that can rectify the classification under
L0 perturbations are urgently needed. By identifying and exploiting the inherent
characteristics of L0 AEs, we develop AEPecker that thwarts this type of attacks.
Its novel Siamese-network-based design shows very high accuracies in detecting L0
AEs, and its inpainting-based preprocessing technique can effectively rectify those
AEs and thus correct the classification results. Plus, it is resilient to adaptive attacks
that bypass prior approaches.
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Chapter 4
Comprehensive Adversarial Examples Detector
with Hybrid Design
4.1

Introduction

In the previous chapters, we have demonstrated the noticeable characteristics of L0
and L2 attacks, so we tailor our detectors accordingly. Next, we will systematically
combine two proposed detecting techniques together to cover all categories of AEs,
i.e., L0 , L2 , and L∞ attacks.
To integrate the L∞ AEs into existing detection frameworks, we statistically compare different kinds of AEs in terms of the distortion degree. In fact, researchers have
investigated the overall perturbations caused by various AE attacks and found that
L2 often lead to lower distortion by taking both the number of altered pixels and
their amplitude into consideration. For example, Liang et al. pointed out that “CW
L2 attack can find adversarial examples with at least two times lower distortion than
FGSM” [54]. Furthermore, Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 (which are extracted from Table
2 in [17]) quantitatively show the results evaluated on 100 seed images. In particular,
“the L0 distortion is normalized by the number of pixels (e.g., 0.560 means 56% of
all pixels in the image are modified)” [17]. We can see that the amplitude of altered
pixels caused by L0 is remarkable. The difference between the number of altered
pixels by L2 and L∞ is not statistically significant. Even from the perspective of the
L∞ distance, the difference is not significantly higher. But, the overall distortions
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Table 4.1: Distortion evaluation of attacks on CIFAR-10.
Type
L∞
L2
L0

Attack
FGSM
IGSM
CW-L∞
DeepFool
CW-L2
JSMA
CW-L0

Success
Rate
85%
92%
100%
98%
100%
98%
100%

Distortion
L∞
L2
L0
0.016 0.863 0.997
0.008 0.368 0.993
0.012 0.446 0.990
0.028 0.235 0.995
0.034 0.288 0.768
0.896 4.954 0.079
0.650 2.103 0.019

Table 4.2: Distortion evaluation of attacks on ImageNet.
Type
L∞
L2
L0

Attack
FGSM
IGSM
CW-L∞
DeepFool
CW-L2
CW-L0

Success
Rate
99%
100%
99%
89%
90%
100%

Distortion
L∞
L2
L0
0.008 3.009 0.994
0.004 1.406 0.984
0.006 1.312 0.850
0.027 0.726 0.984
0.019 0.666 0.323
0.898 6.825 0.003

in terms of Euclidean distance by L2 is approximately two times to four times lower
than the L∞ AEs.
Therefore, we use a uniform Siamese-network-based detector like AEPecker to
tackle both L0 and L∞ AEs. If the images cannot be labelled as adversarial in
this step, they will be further checked by the follow-up Themis. We will detailedly
describe our hybrid system design in Section 4.2.
This proposed comprehensive AE detector acquires the strengths from the two
aforementioned detection techniques. In this way, the new detector not only inherits
all noticeable features from it assembly components, but also is extended to cover all
kinds of AEs. Our evaluation shows that it is able to accurately distinguish various
AEs with a low false positive rate on benign images.
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4.2

System Design

The Figure 4.1 shows the system architecture of our proposed hybrid AE detector.
It consists of two modules, i.e. AEPecker and Themis. After feeding an image I
and its counterpart I 0 (that is manipulated by the pre-processor) into AEPecker,
this module can decide whether I is adversarial. If not, I will be input to Themis,
so that a further check can be made. Only if the latter module outputs a negative
label again, can I be confirmed as benign.

Figure 4.1: The architecture of proposed detector.

4.2.1

Pre-processor

In the original design of AEPecker, only our proposed inpaiting-based pre-processor
is deployed. To enhance the performance of our hybrid detector, we propose using kmeans based color quantization as a color depth reducer after applying the inpaitingbased pre-processor. Therefore, in our new system, we manipulate an input image I
using the proposed inpaiting-based method first. After that, we process the resulting
image with k-means based color quantization to obtain I 0 .
One pixel in a true-color image has three color channels, i.e. R, G and B, each
of which also needs an 8-bit integer to represent a component in such channel. Consequently, a color image theoretically provides 224 possible values for each pixel. In
reality, we can significantly reduce the the number of color in an original image without fundamentally decreasing the image recognizability to humans.
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Original

32

16

8

4

Figure 4.2: Images with color quantization based on the k-means algorithm.

1

Almost any clustering algorithm in 3D space can be applied as a color quantizater.
In particular, Celebi [71] analyzed the performance of k-means as a color quantizer
and demonstrated it can outperform other color quantization methods. Therefore, we
perform a k-means based color quantization for a given image with N unique colors.
In the resultant image, N is finally reduced to k, where k  N . Figure 4.2 shows
some concrete instances where the original color images are from CIFAR-10 dataset.
With k-means based color quantizer, we obtained the corresponding resultant images
with different numbers of unique colors.
The value selection for the parameter k depends on the number of unique colors
in the image and the size of image. We investigate the impacts of different values
of k on the adversarial perturbation reduction, taking CIFAR-10 as an example.
Only successful AEs are used in our evaluation, so without k-means based color
quantization, the target DNN cannot make a correct prediction, i.e. the classification
1

The first column shows the original images from CIFAR-10 dataset. The following columns
show the corresponding versions with different numbers of unique colors after being pre-processed.
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Table 4.3: Impacts of different values of k (CIFAR-10).
Attack
FGSM
IGSM
JSMA

k
4
45.5%
43.5%
38.6%

8
49.8%
42.4%
34.8%

16
36.8%
18.9%
31.2%

32
23.6%
2.7%
27.9%

accuracies are all 0%. As Table 4.3 shows, after using the proposed pre-processor,
the influence of adversarial perturbations are reduced. Considering the size of images
from CIFAR-10 is small, as k increases, the effect of k-means based color quantization
weakens. The pre-processor deployed in our system aims to reduce the influence of
adversarial perturbation but keep the features in images which may help a target
DNN to make correct predictions. Therefore, we empirically adopt k = 8 in the
following experiments.

4.2.2

Model Training

Since the L∞ AEs detection is integrated into the AEPecker framework, we retrain this Siamese-network-based module. In particular, Given an image I and its
pre-processed version I 0 , the Siamese network takes hI, I 0 i as inputs, where the label
is positive if I is either an L0 or L∞ AE. Otherwise, if I is a benign image or an L2
AE, we label the image pair hI, I 0 i as negative in the dataset.
It is worth noting that Themis works as a plugin to enhance the overall detection
system, thus no extra changes are needed for it.

4.3

Evaluation

As summarized in Table 4.4, we compare the proposed hybrid detector with other
prior works [17, 24, 25]. We use the same attack settings as used in these works. Our
detector outperforms Feature Squeezing [17] and LID [25] in terms of detection rate
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and FPR. Nic [24] achieves a roughly comparable performance with the proposed
detector, but ours FPR of is still the lowest.
Table 4.4: Comparison with other prior detectors in terms of detection rate and FPR.

4.4

Detector

FPR

Proposed
NIC
FS
LID

3.3%
4.2%
4.9%
5.6%

FGSM
98%
100%
21%
94%

IGSM
98%
100%
55%
96%

Attack
DeepFooL CW-L2
99%
100%
91%
96%
77%
100%
84%
86%

JSMA
99%
94%
84%
92%

CW-L0
98%
98%
98%
90%

Summary

Although the previously proposed Themis and AEPecker are not a panacea for
detecting against all possible attacks, it easy to combine them together or deploy
them as a complement to tackle a wider variety of AE attacks. To demonstrate this
point, we propose a comprehensive AE detector acquires the strengths from its two
assembly modules. In particular, we propose an enhanced pre-processor and re-train
the Siamese-network-based detector. The evaluation results show that our system
outperforms other state-of-the-art detectors in terms of both the high detection rate
and the low FPR.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The existence of adversarial examples is considered as a fatal threat to the neuralnetwork-based applications. Therefore, how to effectively protect the neural- network
against AE attacks attracts more and more interests from the research community.
We have observed that many AE detectors have been proposed. However, recent
studies show that the detection usually goes ineffective when facing adaptive L2 AEs.
To this end, we propose a novel detection technique against DNN adversarial examples, based on the observation that L2 AEs are sensitive to the Erase-and-Restore
operations, while benign samples are not. To provide a deeper understanding of the
proposed technique, we have qualitatively and quantitatively interpreted the sensitivity distinction of AEs and benign images to E&R operations. The evaluation results
show that the proposed detector outperforms other state-of-the-art approaches in
terms of both detection rates and false positive rates. In addition, our detector is
target-model agnostic, keeps effective across different L2 attack methods (i.e., good
transferability across attack methods), and is resilient to adaptive attacks. Furthermore, unlike many other detection methods that are complex and thus difficult to
construct and train, this method is very simple to build and easy to apply in practice.
Another category of AEs which are considered as a challenge by many previous
works is the L0 AE. In the setting of classic L0 AE attacks, a bounded number
of pixels can be corrupted without limiting the amplitude. Many researchers point
out that the effect of heavy perturbations caused by the L0 attack is difficult to
eliminate. However, we argue that this noticeable characteristic is an limitation of
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L0 attacks which leads such AEs can be exploitable. Thus, we develop AEPecker
that thwarts this type of attacks. Its novel Siamese network based design shows very
high accuracies in detecting L0 AEs, and its inpainting-based preprocessing technique
can effectively rectify those AEs and thus correct the classification results. Plus, it is
resilient to adaptive attacks that bypass prior approaches.
Finally, to cover a wider variety of AE attacks, we combine the previously proposed
methods together to obtain a comprehensive hybrid AE detector. This new detection
system acquires both strengths from its two assembly modules. The evaluation results
demonstrate that our system outperforms other state-of-the-art detectors in terms of
both the high detection rate and the low FPR.

5.1

Discussion and Future Work

First, our work shows that only controlling the number of altered pixels without
limiting the resulting amplitude weakens the power of the generated AEs. Thus, for
the purpose of AE generation, how to make a good trade-off between the number of
altered pixels and their amplitude becomes critical when designing new AE generation
algorithms, which is a good direction worth being explored.
In addition, our adaptive attack (following the procedures in [18]) is based on
the exploration of different optimization paths. There exist some other alternative
white-box attacks, such as the method proposed in [20] which attempts to create new
AEs by modifying the loss functions to bypass detectors. Whether other different
adaptive attacks, such as [20], can bypass our detector is interesting, and we plan to
investigate it in the future.
Another possible adaptive attack is to limit the perturbations in a restricted area
that the defender is not aware of. Most prior works [72–74] that limit perturbed
pixels to a given sub-region use L0 -norm. We notice that some recent works [75,
76] that only perturb pixels in a limited region also use L2 -norm to achieve better

69

invisibility. However, their modified regions or even pixels are predictable, which
can be exploited by an AE detector. Therefore, how to limit the L2 perturbation to
an arbitrary sub-region is still an open question. A future task is to investigate the
effectiveness of E&R once such L2 perturbations are available.
Furthermore, this work focuses on attacks launched against digital images; we
notice that physical attacks [77, 78] are attracting more and more interests from
the research community. In particular, patch-based AEs, which are widely used in
physical attacks, are not in the scope of this work. However, it is interesting to study
the effectiveness of E&R on physical attacks [77]. We leave this as our future work.
Finally, some recent studies on certified robustness have attracted much interest from the research community. For example, Cohen et al. [79] present a certified
robustness guarantee in norm for the smoothed classifier that is obtained by using
Gaussian noise. Furthermore, Jia et al. [80] derive a tight robustness in norm for toppredictions when using randomized smoothing with Gaussian noise. Some related
works [81, 82] also show that inpainting has a side effect of denoising by smoothing
the interpolated pixels. Our inpainting-based approach can be considered as an alternative to randomized smoothing. Thus, it is interesting to analyze the certified
accuracy of our inpainting-based method. We plan to explore this in our future work.
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